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ABSTRACT
Discrimination scholars have traditionally justified antidiscrimination laws
by appealing to the value of equality. Egalitarian theories locate the moral
wrong of discrimination in the unfavorable treatment one individual receives
as compared to another. However, discrimination theory has neglected to
engage seriously with the socio-legal category of age, which poses a
challenge to this egalitarian consensus due to its unique temporal character.
Unlike other identity categories, an individual’s age inevitably changes over
time. Consequently, any age-based legal rule or private discrimination will
ultimately yield equal treatment over the lifecourse. This explains the weak
constitutional protection for age and the fact that age-based legal rules are
commonplace, determining everything from access to health care to criminal
sentences to voting rights. The central claim of this Article is that equality
can neither adequately describe the moral wrong of age discrimination nor
justify the current landscape of statutory age discrimination law. The wrong
of age discrimination lies not in a comparison, but instead in the deprivation
of some intrinsic interest that extends throughout the lifecourse. Thus, we
must turn to non-comparative values, such as liberty or dignity, to flesh out
the theoretical foundation of age discrimination law. Exploring this
alternative normative foundation generates valuable insights for current
debates in discrimination theory and the legal regulation of age.
INTRODUCTION
Richard Posner caused a stir in 2017 when he advocated for a mandatory
retirement age of 80 for federal judges.1 His comments were particularly
pointed, given the retirement rumors that swirled around Justice Anthony
Kennedy (then aged 80), and Posner’s simultaneous attacks on the
intellectual quality of current and former members of the Supreme Court.2
While Posner was being characteristically provocative, his proposal would
not be unique in our legal regime, which is full of age-based rules.3 The
1 Joel Cohen, Richard A. Posner, & Jed S. Rakoff, Should There be Age Limits for
Federal Judges?, SLATE (July 5, 2017 5:11 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/should_there_be_age_limits_for_federal_judges.html
(“I
believe there should be mandatory retirement for all judges at a fixed age, probably 80.” . . .
“There are loads of persons capable of distinction as Supreme Court justices; no need for
octogenarians.”).
2 See id. (“Anyone think there’s a giant or giantess on the Supreme Court today?”). To
his credit, Posner retired last year before his own age cutoff. See Jason Meisner & Patrick M.
O’Connell, Richard Posner Announces Sudden Retirement from Federal Appeals Court in
Chicago, CHI. TRIB. (Sep. 1, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com /news/local/breaking/ctjudge-richard-posner-retires-met-20170901-story.html.
3 See JOHN MACNICOL, AGE DISCRIMINATION 4 (2006) (“Age distinctions, age
stratifications, age judgments, and ‘age-appropriate behaviours’ are subtly woven into our
patterns of thinking, as a way of making sense of the world.”).
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Constitution has no fewer than four age requirements for voting and running
for elected office.4 Federal regulations use age as a factor in determining
criminal sentences as well as Social Security Disability benefits.5 And at the
state level, age is used to determine when you can enter into contracts,6 get
married,7 or have sex.8 The government is permitted to draw these types of
age distinctions because they are subject only to rational basis review in the
Equal Protection constitutional regime.9
At the same time that legal rules extensively employ age,
antidiscrimination statutes prohibit its use in a variety of domains. For
example, federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of age in any
program receiving federal financial assistance as well as in private
employment decisions.10 Many states prohibit age discrimination in housing
as well.11 In 2017, the California legislature went so far as to prevent the
Internet Movie Database from publishing actors’ ages so as to inhibit the use
of that information in hiring decisions.12 Age-based legal regulation even

4 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years”); id. at art I § 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years”); id. at art II § 1 (“neither shall any Person
be eligible to that Office [of President] who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five
Years”); id. at amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years
of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on
account of age.”).
5 See 21 U.S.C. 859(a) (2012) (doubling the penalty if the perpetrator is above eighteen
and distributed a controlled substance to someone younger than twenty one); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (2010) (“Age (including youth) may be relevant
in determining whether a departure is warranted”); Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R.
§ Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 (2008) (describing the guidelines that incorporate age in evaluating
eligibility for benefits).
6 See 5 RICHARD A. LORD, 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:3 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing
the contractual age of majority in various jurisdictions).
7 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-6 (West 2016) (setting the age to marry at eighteen);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.010 (West 2016) (seventeen); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.101
(West 2016) (eighteen).
8 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A) (2010) (setting the age of consent at
eighteen); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.50(b) (West Supp. 2015) (seventeen); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.364(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (sixteen).
9 See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (mandatory retirement for foreign service
officers at age sixty permissible under the Equal Protection Clause); Massachusetts Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that police officers over the age of fifty did
not constitute a suspect class).
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012) (prohibiting age discrimination in “any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”); 29 U.S.C. §623 (2012) (prohibiting agebased employment discrimination).
11 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c (West 2017) (prohibiting the refusal to
sell or rent because of age); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (West 2016) (same).
12 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83.5 (West 2017) (“A commercial online entertainment
employment service provider . . . shall not . . . (1) Publish or make public the subscriber's date
of birth or age information in an online profile of the subscriber.”). This law was ruled
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affects online dating: In early 2018, a court ruled that Tinder, the smartphone
dating app, could not discriminate against people over thirty by charging
them more for expanded in-app services.13
Despite this widespread incorporation of age into the law and contrasting
legal rejection of private age discrimination, theorists have devoted scant
attention to age as compared to other socio-legal categories, such as race,
class, or sex.14 This is unfortunate, as age is a salient social trait that is
distinct from other identity categories in interesting and important ways. On
the one hand, age is considered immutable because it is outside one’s control,
similar to race or sex.15 On the other hand, it is also clearly mutable—like
religion, class, and disability—because one’s age changes over time.16
Unlike these other mutable characteristics, however, age’s mutability is
deterministic rather than being a consequence of choice or chance. In other
words, people inevitably age.17 Thus, any legal rules that incorporate age
inherently implicate either our past, present, or future selves.18 These traits
give age a unique temporal character, which influences determinations of
when age-based distinctions might be wrongful.
Most discrimination scholars base their moral theories of
discrimination—i.e. why discrimination is wrong and why the law should
intervene to prevent that wrong—on the value of equality.19 While capable
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. See IMDB.com v. Becerra, No. 16-cv-06535VC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018) (order granting summary judgment).
13 See Candelore v. Tinder, Inc., No. B270172, 2018 WL 580246, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 29, 2018) (concluding that this age distinction was contrary to law because it constituted
“an arbitrary, class-based, generalization about older users’ incomes”).
14 See Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Racial Horizons and Empirical Landscapes in the Post-ACA
World, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 493, 504 (noting how age receives less attention than other
categories such as race, class, and gender). Ageism, too, remains understudied. See Michael
S. North & Susan T. Fiske, An Inconvenienced Youth? Ageism and Its Potential
Intergenerational Roots, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 982, 982 (2012) (“[S]urprisingly scant research
examines age-based prejudice, compared with racism and sexism.”).
15 See Peter H. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of
1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 32–33 (1979) (noting that an age-based rule “classifies individuals on
the basis of a characteristic that is immanent and inescapable to them, one suggestive of
neither culpability nor demerit.”).
16 See Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A
Challenge to A Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213, 236 (2010)
(“Chronological age is mutable in the sense that it changes over time.”).
17 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 129–30 (2003)
(“After all, it is not too far off the mark to observe that all of us fall into one of two categories:
we are either old or hoping to get there.”).
18 See JENNIFER RADDEN, DIVIDED MINDS AND SUCCESSIVE SELVES 18–20 (1996)
(describing how time renders the self heterogeneous).
19 This makes sense insofar as equality exerts a steady influence on Western thought and
the language of equality appears in the Constitutional text. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”);
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 3 (1992) (“[T]he major ethical theories of social
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of many formulations, equality is at its core a comparative value, which
means that the wrong of discrimination derives from the differential
treatment one person receives as compared to another similarly-situated
individual.20 The dominance of this comparative method in discrimination
law has led some to call the field “equality law.”21
The central claim of this Article is that equality can neither adequately
describe the moral wrong of age discrimination nor justify the current
landscape of statutory age discrimination law.22 Equality fails to pinpoint
the moral wrong of age discrimination in a wide range of cases because the
relevant comparator in the analysis is always simultaneously someone of a
different age as well as a past or future self.23 In other words, age-based rules
and private age discrimination will inevitably apply to everyone if they are
fortunate to live long enough. Thus, it makes little sense to complain of
unequal treatment—being denied the right to vote until age eighteen or being
forced to retire at age eighty—so long as everyone is treated equally over
their lifetimes.24 Time serves to cure these momentary instances of age
discrimination, whereas it does not do so for other forms of discriminatory
treatment.
Thus, we must turn to non-comparative values, such as liberty or dignity,
to flesh out the theoretical foundation of age discrimination law. Noncomparative values locate the wrong of discrimination in its violation of
some continuous right or interest, regardless of whether or not other people
are similarly deprived.25 The substantive content of this interest may be

arrangement all share an endorsement of equality in terms of some focal variable, even though
the variables that are selected are frequently very different between one theory and another.”);
Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693, 697 (2000) (“The
norm of equality, with its distinctive logic and force, has powerfully shaped the analysis of a
range of critical social issues.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to
Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 575 (1983) (“No value is more thoroughly
entrenched in Western culture than is the notion of equality.”).
20 See Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895, 900
(2016) (“According to the comparative conception of discrimination, we determine whether
X has suffered wrongful discrimination by looking at the treatment X has received . . . and
comparing it to the treatment accorded to at least one other individual.”).
21 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Equality Law Pluralism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1993–
97 (2017) (arguing for expanding equality law beyond antidiscrimination approaches); Noah
D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1367 (2017)
(analyzing equality law as if it were antidiscrimination law).
22 This Article is not the first to question the value of equality or to contrast it with noncomparative approaches. For example, Peter Westen famously critiqued equality as lacking
substantive content and as engendering intellectual confusion. See Peter Westen, The Empty
Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). This Article does not engage in such a
wholesale critique of equality. The narrower focus is on how equality falters in pinpointing
the moral wrong of age discrimination due to age’s unique temporal character.
23 See infra Part II.A.
24 See infra Part II.B.
25 See infra Part III.
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fleshed out in various ways, such as access to fundamental human
capabilities,26 the freedom to deliberate free of costs imposed from morally
irrelevant traits,27 or the ability to avoid opportunity “bottlenecks.”28 For the
purposes of grounding a theory of age discrimination, it only matters that
these entitlements are conceptualized non-comparatively. These types of
interests must generally be respected at all points in time, avoiding the
temporal problems of a comparative equality analysis.29 Thus, in evaluating
whether an age-based legal rule or private action wrongfully discriminates,
we must focus our inquiry on the intrinsic wrongfulness of deprivation rather
than the relative wrongfulness of comparison.
This Article is a scholarly contribution on three fronts. First, it
illuminates the moral foundation of age discrimination law, which remains
largely undertheorized in the legal and philosophical literature.30 This
theoretical foundation is useful for explaining the current state of Equal
Protection jurisprudence with respect to age. It also serves to normatively
ground age discrimination statutes that are currently on the books. Second,
it intervenes in the nascent and vigorous debate among discrimination
scholars on the theoretical foundation of discrimination law more
generally.31 By demonstrating that some non-comparative value is necessary
to identify the moral wrongfulness of at least one type of discrimination, it

26 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY,
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 76–78 (2006) (detailing a list of ten fundamental human capabilities).
27 See Sophia Moreau, What is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 143, 147
(2010) (“In a liberal society, . . . we are each entitled to a set of ‘deliberative freedoms,’
freedoms to deliberate about and decide how to live in a way that is insulated from pressures
stemming from extraneous traits of ours.”)
28 See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 13 (2014)
(defining a bottleneck as “a narrow place in the opportunity structure through which one must
pass in order to successfully pursue a wide range of valued goals.”).
29 See Geoffrey Cupit, Justice, Age, and Veneration, 108 ETHICS 702, 708–09 (1998)
(“Thus, even if (eventually) everyone’s turn to be discriminated against on grounds of age
comes around, it does not follow that such discrimination is just. All that follows is that the
injustice does not arise from the comparison of one person’s lot with another’s.”).
30 See Juliana Bidadanure, Discrimination and Age, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
THE ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION 243, 245 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed. 2017) (“[I]ssues of
age-based inequalities in general and age discrimination in particular remain undertheorized.”); Pnina Alon-Shenker, The Unequal Right to Age Equality: Towards a Dignified
Lives Approach to Age Discrimination, 25 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 243, 244 (2012)
(“[T]here is no comprehensive theory of age discrimination that would explain when and why
age-based distinctions are wrongful.”); Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1813, 1813, 1814 (1996) (claiming that
“the normative foundation of the ADEA remains uncertain” and accepting that “the ADEA
cannot be justified on traditional distributive or rights-based grounds”).
31 See Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 1, 1 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds.,
2013) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS] (noting that the philosophical discussion
of issues in discrimination is a “relatively young field of inquiry”).
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lends support to a more pluralist vision of discrimination law.32 Third, it
adds to the new and growing literature examining the role of time and
temporal analysis in legal scholarship.33 In addition to these theoretical
contributions, this intervention is also well-timed. With the aging of the
population and renewed interest in intergenerational justice among the
young, age-based rules and antidiscrimination statutes will inevitably come
under further scrutiny.34 We must understand their conceptual foundation in
order to better evaluate whether they should be maintained, scaled back, or
expanded going forward.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides the theoretical
background for the argument. It examines age as a socio-legal category,
defines discrimination, and describes the dominant egalitarian theories of
discrimination law. This sets the stage for Part II, which argues that age’s
temporal dimension renders egalitarian theories unable to identify the moral
wrong of many forms of age discrimination. This helps to explain
constitutional Equal Protection jurisprudence, which is not protective of age.
However, it also highlights that we lack both a descriptive account of why
statutory law operates to prohibit age discrimination and a normative account
of why and when the law should do so. Part III fills this gap by sketching
out the contours of a non-comparative approach to age discrimination law
and discusses some of its notable implications for discrimination theory and
the legal regulation of age.

32

See infra Part III.C.1.
See generally ELIZABETH F. COHEN, THE POLITICAL VALUE OF TIME (2018) (viewing
time as an essential element of our political economy); FRANK FAGAN & SAUL LEVMORE, THE
TIMING OF LAWMAKING (2017) (examining how legislative and judicial functions should be
influenced by timing); Mark Glover, The Timing of Testation, 107 KY. L. J. __ (2018)
(empirically evaluating when people execute wills); Elise C. Boddie, The Contested Role of
Time in Equal Protection, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1825 (2017) (examining how time intersects
with remedies for race discrimination); Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexual Advance Directives,
68 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2016) (exploring the temporal dimension in sexual consent); Adam B.
Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361, 372 (2007) (assessing
the temporal frame for understanding voting rights violations).
34 See Mark Mather et al., Aging in the United States, 70 POP. BULL. 1, 2–3 (2015) (noting
that those aged sixty-five and over are projected to total almost 100 million 2060); David
Leonhardt,
Old
vs.
Young,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
22,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/the-generation-gap-is-back.html
(noting intergenerational tension with respect to political beliefs, economic opportunities, and
social practices).
33
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I. AGE AND DISCRIMINATION
This Part provides the background for the Article’s central arguments.
Section A examines age, ageism, and age-based law. Section B explores the
concept of discrimination and how the value of equality and its comparative
method underlie many theories of discrimination law.
A. Age
Age is a numerical measure of time since birth.35 The state’s extensive
birth records allow for easy verification of one’s birthdate and thus one’s
age.36 While this lends age an air of objective fact, there is nothing
intrinsically informative about age as such. Advances in science have
demonstrated that various biomarkers such as telomere length may provide
a better picture of one’s physical state.37 Aging itself is characterized by
diversity rather than homogeneity, as genetic differences interact with varied
life experiences to give vastly different content to peoples’ lives, even if they
might be the same age.38 Further, age derives much of its meaning from
social processes and cultural contexts.39 That being said, age is not
subjectively determined either. Individuals might not “feel” their age, but
they would not be able to plausibly claim that they are indeed a different age,
even if they might describe themselves as an “old soul” or “young at heart.”

35

Chronological age is a convenient starting point for this project, but it does not exhaust
the definitions or meanings of age. Age has biological, psychological, and social dimensions
as well. See Richard A. Settersen, Jr. & Bethany Godlewski, Concepts and Theories of Age
and Aging, in HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF AGING 9, 9–14 (Vern L. Bengtson & Richard A.
Settersen, Jr. eds., 3d ed. 2016). These are important for analyzing how discrimination
operates, but chronological age is the basis of age-based law and thus is central to the legal
analysis.
36 See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1143 (2002) (“States maintain a smorgasbord of public
records, covering one’s life from birth to death.”). At the margins, there might be problems
of evidence for individuals who do not have adequate documentation of their age. See, e.g.,
Ross Pearson, What’s My Age Again? The Immigrant Age Problem in the Criminal Justice
System, 98 MINN. L. REV. 745, 747–48 (2013) (describing how many immigrants may lack
birth records due to lack of registration in the country of origin).
37 See, e.g., Paola Sebastiani et al., Biomarker Signatures of Aging, 16 AGING CELL 329,
333–36 (2017) (exploring the relationship between various biomarkers and aging); Jason L.
Sanders & Anne B. Newman, Telomere Length in Epidemiology: A Biomarker of Aging, AgeRelated Disease, Both, or Neither?, 35 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 112, 123 (2013) (concluding that
telomere length is associated with aging).
38 See Linda S. Whitton, Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 453,
468 (1997) (noting that “most current literature rejects the decline and failure paradigm of
normal aging, concluding that both cognitive and physiological changes occur in varying
degrees and at individuated rates.”).
39 See MACNICOL, supra note 3, at 3–4 (“A basic truism of gerontology is that age per se
is meaningless: it is always mediated through social processes and cultural attitudes.”).
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It is precisely age’s numerical nature and verifiability—its
administrability—that makes it so attractive for use in the law.40 As a matter
of form, perhaps the most frequent use of age in legal directives is its
inclusion in bright-line rules as a triggering fact.41 For example, age plays a
major role in demarcating the transition from childhood to adulthood in both
the public and private spheres.42 On the public side, age-based rules
determine when you can vote,43 sit on a jury,44 obtain a driver’s license,45
stay outside at night,46 or legally drink alcohol.47 In the private realm, age
determines when you can consent to sex,48 make medical decisions involving
your own body,49 get married,50 emancipate yourself from your parents’
control,51 or enter into contracts.52 Age is used to impose responsibilities as

40 See Howard Eglit, Of Age and the Constitution, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859, 860 (1981)
(“Rather than a program administrator having to engage in the time-consuming and costly
exercise of determining whether a given individual does or does not fit into a programmatic
charter, he can rely upon a clear, indisputable fact—the age of the person involved.”).
41 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22, 58 (1992) (noting that rules “bind a decisionmaker to respond to the presence of delimited
triggering facts.”).
42 See Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55, 62 (2016)
(“Childhood and adulthood are also socially and legally constructed statuses whose meanings
have varied dramatically over time and across cultures.”).
43 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States, who
are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
any state on account of age.”)
44 See Act of Apr. 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-269, 86 Stat. 117; 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012)
(requiring the federal jurors be “a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who has
resided for a period of one year within the judicial district”). See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. §
494.425 (West 2016) (setting the age at 21); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1601 (West 2016)
(setting the age at 19).
45 See Driver’s Licenses in the United States, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Driver%27s
_licenses_in_the_United_States (collecting different states’ requirements).
46 See, e.g., CHICAGO, IL. CODE 8-16-020 (2017) (creating an offense if a minor stays “in
any public place or on the premises of any establishment within the city during curfew
hours.”)
47 See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) (restricting federal funds to states that have a drinking age
below twenty one).
48 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A) (2010) (eighteen); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.50(b) (West Supp. 2015) (seventeen); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.364(6)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (sixteen).
49 See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent
Medical Decision-Making, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 409, 427–32 (2002) (discussing the different
attempts by states to actualize minor medical decision-making).
50 See Legal Information Institute, Marriage Laws: Marriage Laws of the Fifty States,
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/table_marriage.
51 See Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1037 (1982) (noting that “attainment of an
appropriate age” is one way in which emancipation may occur) (citations omitted).
52 See 5 RICHARD A. LORD, 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:3 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing
the contractual age of majority in various jurisdictions). You cannot, however, enter into a
contract with a credit card company until you turn twenty one. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8) (2012)
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well. All males must register for the selective service at age eighteen,53
which is also the age at which the state may execute you for committing
serious crimes.54
Age-based law is not limited to bright-line maturity rules, however, and
it extends into almost every field of law. It appears in criminal law, defining
the scope of crimes such as elder abuse and determining the length of
criminal sentences.55 It structures health law, notably through the provision
of the Affordable Care Act that permits adult children to stay on their
parents’ health care plans until they are twenty-six.56 It is used in tax law
through the provision of a higher standard deduction to those who have
turned sixty-five.57 Zoning laws often employ age-based rules to create a
supply of housing for an older adult population.58 In family law, age is a
factor in calculating alimony awards at divorce and in determining
appropriate parents for adoption.59 Further, Social Security Disability
regulations employ age in the award of disability benefits, making it easier

(“No credit card may be issued to, or open end consumer credit plan established by or on
behalf of, a consumer who has not attained the age of 21”).
53 See 50 U.S.C. § 3803 (2012) (setting an age limit of eighteen to twenty-six years for
selective service).
54 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that the death penalty
cannot be imposed on juvenile offenders).
55 See ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-21 (2006) (making it a crime to knowingly act or fail to act
to maintain the health of an elderly person, defined as “a person 60 years of age or older who
is incapable of adequately providing for his own health and personal care”). See also 21
U.S.C. 859(a) (2012) (doubling the penalty if the perpetrator is above 18 and distributed a
controlled substance to someone younger than 21); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5H1.1 (2010) (“Age (including youth) may be relevant in determining whether a departure is
warranted”).
56 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14 (2012) (“A group health plan and a health insurance issuer
offering group or individual health insurance coverage that provides dependent coverage of
children shall continue to make such coverage available for an adult child until the child turns
26 years of age.”).
57 See 26 U.S.C. § 63 (2012) (“The taxpayer shall be entitled to an additional amount of
$600--(A) for himself if he has attained age 65 before the close of his taxable year”).
58 See 2 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 23:30 (4th ed. 2017 Supp.)
(noting the enactment of “zoning ordinances that provide for development wherein permanent
residency is restricted to senior citizens, and has led many private developers to develop
similar communities governed by age-restrictive restrictive covenants.”).
59 See Bailey v. Bailey, 617 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“In my own
mind, the factor of age weighs more heavily in favor of permanent alimony when the spouse
requesting permanent alimony is approaching fifty.”); Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges
Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 401, 486 (1996) (noting that “only three variables -- the wife's age, her health, and
marital duration -- were significantly correlated with the decision to award alimony for an
unlimited time period.”). See also In re ASF, 876 N.W.2d 253, 263 (2015) (declaring that
consideration of the adoptive parents’ ages did not violate the law); Matter of Baby Boy P.,
664 N.Y.S.2d 340, 341 (1997) (noting that “the age of the prospective adoptive parents is one
factor that may be considered” even if it is not decisive).
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to qualify for them if you are older, even with the same level of
impairments.60
This panoply of legal rules highlights the other reason for age’s extensive
use in the law, which is that it serves a vessel for substantial social meaning.61
Age is socially salient, ranking among the first identity characteristics that
we notice about each other.62 It functions as a convenient basis for social
judgments and decision-making, primarily as a proxy for a variety of target
variables of interest.63 Based on an individual’s age, we might assume that
a person is wise or immature, well-versed in technology, or going through
some kind of age-based “life crisis.”64 It helps people to evaluate who “looks
good for their age,” and it is an essential descriptor on dating apps that allows
users to determine whether someone is acceptable as a potential mate.65 The
use of age extends to the professional sphere, with doctors using it to evaluate
whether patients have reached an age at which screening for certain
conditions is recommended, such as mammograms for breast cancer.66 Age

60 See Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 (2008)
(describing the guidelines that incorporate age in evaluating eligibility for benefits)
61 See GAIL WILSON, UNDERSTANDING OLD AGE: CRITICAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
17–19 (2000) (discussing different cultural understandings of age); Liat Ayalon et al., Macroand Micro-Level Predictors of Age Categorization: Results from the European Social Survey,
11 EUR. J. AGING 5, 14–16 (2014) (describing the various ways in which attitudes towards age
and aging differ across individuals and societies).
62 See Bernice L. Neugarten et al., Age Norms, Age Constraints, and Adult Socialization,
in THE MEANINGS OF AGE: SELECTED PAPERS OF BERNICE L. NEUGARTEN 24, 24 (Dail A.
Neugarten ed. 1996) (“In all societies, age is one of the bases for the ascription of status and
one of the underlying dimensions by which social interaction is regulated.”). It is this salience
that contributes to the wrongfulness of age discrimination and makes age a good candidate
for regulation through antidiscrimination law. See KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, BORN FREE
AND EQUAL?: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF DISCRIMINATION 30–36 (2014)
(arguing for the importance of social salience in defining wrongful discrimination);
TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW at 95–96 (2015) (incorporating
salience into the relative disadvantage condition for the norm of discrimination law).
63 See Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the Forgotten,
86 CAL. L. REV. 315, 318 (1998) ([P]roxy discrimination is merely a tool used to identify a
class of persons or things with a different identifying trait, the ‘target’”).
64 See Lynda Gratton & Andrew Scott, Our Assumptions about Old and Young Workers
are Wrong, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 14, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/our-assumptionsabout-old-and-young-workers-are-wrong (noting assumptions about older and younger
workers and how these groups might have much in common). Conversely, we might infer
what a person’s age is based on certain characteristics we associate with certain ages.
65 See Mary Ward, Have Dating Apps Made Age More Important Than Ever?, THE
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 14, 2017), http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/life-andrelationships/have-dating-apps-made-age-more-important-than-ever-before-20171005gyuvta.html (“Imagine if you walked into a bar and everyone was wearing a name tag that
instantly told you how old they were. That’s what using Tinder is like. But it’s weirder,
because you’ve walked into the bar and everyone isn’t just wearing age tags: everyone above
and below your selected age range isn’t there.”).
66 See Kevin C. Oeffinger et al., Breast Cancer Screening for Women at Average Risk,
314 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1599, 1600 (2015) (“Women with an average risk of breast cancer
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also has normative force, regulating conduct through the delineation of ageappropriate beliefs or behavior.67 At times, this may lead to age being used
as the basis for treating others poorly, denying them housing, employment
opportunities, or medical care.68
This raises the specter of ageism, defined as prejudice, stereotyping, or
discrimination on the basis of age or perceived age.69 While ageism is often
discussed in reference to older people, it can be directed at any age group.70
For example, beliefs that young people are inherently irresponsible or that
older adults’ bodies are disgusting are both ageist. Just as with racism or
sexism, ageism can be explicit or implicit.71 It operates at multiple levels, as
individuals, social networks, institutions, and culture can all be ageist.72 The
behavioral component of ageism—age discrimination—imports a normative
element into its definition. This is precisely the topic that this Article seeks
to illuminate by examining what transforms benign differential treatment
based on age into wrongful discrimination and how this should be addressed
in the legal sphere. To perform this analysis, it is necessary to delve deeper
into age’s particular characteristics.
Age is a unique socio-legal category that shares select features with
several other identity characteristics.73 Age, like race or sex, is considered

should undergo regular screening mammography starting at age 45 years. (Strong
Recommendation)”).
67 See HOWARD EGLIT, ELDERS ON TRIAL: AGE AND AGEISM IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 7 (2004) (“Age also functions informally as a powerful normative device for
influencing—and sometimes dictating—attitudes and conduct. . . . ‘Act your age’ is a
common admonition reflecting this phenomenon.”).
68 See ERDMAN B. PALMORE, AGEISM: NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE 119–151 (1999)
(collecting instances of ageism in the economy, government, family, housing, and health
care).
69 See Thomas Nicolaj Iversen et al., A Conceptual Analysis of Ageism, 61 NORDIC
PSYCHOL. 4, 15 (2009) (“Ageism is defined as negative or positive stereotypes, prejudice
and/or discrimination against (or to the advantage of ) elderly people on the basis of their
chronological age or on the basis of a perception of them as being ‘old’ or ‘elderly’. Ageism
can be implicit or explicit and can be expressed on a micro-, meso- or macro-level.”). While
this is the most comprehensive definition of ageism in the literature, it requires further
tweaking to acknowledge that ageism may be directed at any age group, not just the elderly.
70 See North & Fiske, supra note 14, at 991 (“Though its focus usually connotes prejudice
toward older people, the word ageism naturally includes people discriminated against at any
age); Jack C. Westman, Juvenile Ageism: Unrecognized Prejudice and Discrimination
Against the Young, 21 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEV. 237, 240–46 (1991) (describing
manifestations of institutionalized ageism against children).
71 See Maria Clara P. de Paula Couto & Dirk Wentura, Implicit Ageism, in AGEISM:
STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 37, 48–51 (Todd D. Nelson ed.
2017) (comparing implicit and explicit measures of ageism).
72 See JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE:
INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND SEXISM 12–14 (1978) (contrasting an individual view of racism
and sexism with an institutional analysis).
73 See Stewart J. Schwab & Garth Glissman, Age and Disability Within the Scope of
American Discrimination Law, in DISABILITY AND AGING DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES IN
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to be immutable in the law, even if these categories are more unstable than
the law might suggest.74 Nevertheless, while some individuals may be able
to “pass” as a different age, you cannot choose your own age, nor can you
speed up or slow down the progression of time.75 On the other hand, age
also shares with traits like religion, class, and disability that it is mutable.76
In other words, one’s status within the identity category can change
throughout the lifecourse. Just as people convert religions, experience class
mobility, or suffer accidents that leave them with impairments, so too do
people age and obtain membership in progressively older age groups.
However, age differs from these other mutable characteristics in that it is
inevitably mutable.77 One may or may not change religions, but it is certain
that we will all become older as time passes. Finally, age shares with these
other traits that it is morally irrelevant.78 Moral irrelevance in this context
means that a characteristic does not have a relationship to entitlement or
desert, nor does it constitute a person as morally superior or inferior.79

LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 145, 154 (Richard L. Wiener & Steven L. Willborn, eds. 2011)
(describing how age compares to sex, race, and disability on the dimensions of definitional
ease, visibility, empathy, legality, political clout, and size).
74 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, (1973) (“[S]ex, like race and national
origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth.”). Age, too,
is an accident of birth, specifically when said birth was. While this represents the legal
consensus, the reality is more complex. Race is socially constructed and malleable, subject
to contestation and judicial adjudication in particular cases. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE
BY LAW 10TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 8 (2006) (“Race is
not, however, simply a matter of physical appearance and ancestry. Instead, it is primarily a
function of the meanings given to these. On this level, too, law creates races.”). Sex is
similarly subject to contestation by transgender, genderqueer, and nonbinary individuals, who
eschew the sex classifications applied to them at birth. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated
and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (involving a transgender boy who wanted access to
boys restrooms); Sonia K. Katyal, The Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 392
(2017) (describing the increasing forms of sex/gender identification).
75 See JOHN A. VINCENT, INEQUALITY AND OLD AGE 97 (1995) (“Ageing is a biological
process that happens to all of us from the moment we are born. It is a continuous process.”).
76 See A. Kohn, supra note 16, at 236 (“Chronological age is mutable in the sense that it
changes over time.”).
77 See Jan Baars, Concepts of Time in Age and Aging, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF
THE PHILOSOPHY OF AGING 69, 71–72 (Geoffrey Scarre ed., 2016) (noting how chronometric
time is both exact and continuous).
78 This is not entirely uncontroversial. There is a view, commonly associated with nonWestern cultures, that advanced age in fact enhances one’s status. See Cupit, supra note 29,
at 714–18 (exploring the “veneration thesis” and concluding that age may in fact enhance
moral status by virtue of its entailing that there is more to us as historical beings). This view
would at best support age discrimination in favor of the aged, not age discrimination tout
court. In addition, it is not clear that it holds much sway in the United States context; respect
for the aged may in fact derive from more utilitarian grounds that are easily confused with the
belief that age enhances status. See id. at 715.
79 See Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 800 (1993) (“A
difference is morally irrelevant if it has no relationship to individual entitlement or desert.”).
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While age certainly possesses unique characteristics, it is worth noting
that age does not exist in a vacuum. Other traits, such as class, disability,
gender identity, race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation, intersect with age
to produce different types of lived experiences.80 Further, the intersection of
ageism with discrimination on the basis of other identity characteristics can
create particular forms of disadvantage that are unique and more pernicious
than just the compound disadvantage that one might experience from each
characteristic individually.81 For example, consider the intersection of sex
and age in Hollywood. While age is not necessarily a problem for aging
male actors, who continue to find work and roles, older women lack such
opportunities.82 This is directly related both to the sexist judgment of women
by their appearance, but also by the ageist judgment that youthfulness is
attractive and agedness is not.83 In this context, these two forms of prejudice
combine and reinforce one another.84
Whether discrimination derives solely from age or from age in
combination with other characteristics, the time is ripe for an inquiry into the
moral foundations of age discrimination law. The population is aging, with

See also Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 117 (1998) (“it is indisputable that race and gender
are ‘morally irrelevant,’ in the sense of not constituting persons as inferior or superior”).
80 See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS & SIRMA BILGE, INTERSECTIONALITY 2 (2016) (“[P]eople’s
lives and the organization of power in a given society are better understood as being shaped
not by a single axis of social division, be it gender or race or class, but by many axes that
work together and influence each other.”); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of
Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 768 (1994) (noting how intersectionality allows for
those at the intersections to be recognized as “proper legal subjects”); Kimberlé Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. L. F. 139,
139–40 (noting the need to center the experiences of those at the intersections).
81 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 701, 708 (2001) (noting that “systems of discrimination—e.g., racism, sexism,
homophobia, and classism—are themselves intersectional.”).
82 See Ann Hornaday, Hollywood Ageism Punishes Actresses, But the Art House Offers
Some Hope, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
style/hollywood-ageism-punishes-actress-but-the-art-house-offers-some-hope/2017/03/
09/ce7e0e24-040c-11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html (“[T]here’s no doubt that women
are far more affected by the movie industry’s obsession with sex appeal and physical beauty,
resulting in a giant absence in female roles once actresses reach their 50s and 60s.”).
83 See TONI CALASANTI & KATHLEEN F. SLEVIN, GENDER, SOCIAL INEQUALITIES, AND
AGING 54 (2001) (“Ageism interfaces with sexism to put pressure on women to be a particular
shape and size, to portray a youthful image even if old.”).
84 See Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the
Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16, 27 (1995) (“The lessons of anti-essentialism
and intersectionality are that the oppressions cannot be dismantled separately because they
mutually reinforce each other.”). The intersection of ageism with other forms of disadvantage
would not be news to early theorists of ageism. See Robert N. Butler, Age-Ism: Another Form
of Bigotry, 9 THE GERONTOLOGIST 243, 243 (1969) (using an intersectional example of lowincome, black, senior citizens to illustrate ageism, the term he coined).
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those older than sixty-five projected to total almost 100 million by the year
2060.85 The age-based rules that apply to those at the older end of the age
spectrum will thus have increasing effect, allocating social resources and
shaping attitudes about the appropriate content of various life stages.86 In
addition, there is increasing interest among younger segments of the
population in intergenerational justice, specifically as many perceive that
current economic conditions offer fewer opportunities to millennials than
previous generations.87 We must understand the conceptual foundation for
age-based laws and antidiscrimination statutes in order to better evaluate
whether they should be maintained, scaled back, or expanded going forward.
The next Section explores discrimination, antidiscrimination law, and
the role of equality in understanding both.
B. Discrimination
Discrimination is a multilayered concept. At a basic level, it is simply
the practice of drawing distinctions or engaging in differential treatment.88
Individuals discriminate in this sense all the time, for instance by choosing
one style of clothes over another. Used in this way, being “discriminating”
can be seen as a positive trait, if it represents the ability to differentiate
between goods of higher or lower quality, such as in the realms of food or
art.89 However, the word discrimination has a value-laden meaning as well.
At this normative level, discrimination is the morally wrongful drawing of
distinctions or differential treatment.90 The central inquiry here concerns
what, if anything, makes age discrimination morally wrongful. In other
words, when is it wrong to treat individuals differently on the basis of age?
While answering this question does not exhaust all possible normative
arguments about age discrimination, it provides an important basis for

85

See Mark Mather et al., supra note 34, at 2–3.
See STEPHEN KATZ, DISCIPLINING OLD AGE: THE FORMATION OF GERONTOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE 60–69 (1996) (discussing how the legal creation of pensions served to structure
our understanding of the lifecourse). Further, intergenerational issues must be addressed in
various settings, such as the workplace. See, e.g., Michael J. Urick, Understanding and
Managing Intergenerational Conflict: An Examination of Influences and Strategies, 3 WORK,
AGING & RETIREMENT 166, 168 (2016) (describing how the presence of multiple generations
in the workplace can lead to heightened tension).
87 See Leonhardt, supra note 34 (“Younger adults are faring worse in the private sector
and, in large part because they have less political power, have a less generous safety net
beneath them.”).
88 See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 2 (2008).
89 See id.
90 See LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, supra note 62, at 24–25 (terming this the “moralized concept
of discrimination”).
86

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3276514

AGE, TIME, AND DISCRIMINATION

15

evaluating when it is appropriate to incorporate age into the law or enact laws
against age discrimination.91
Antidiscrimination laws confer upon individuals certain rights against
discrimination, which have four essential components that are useful to
define the scope of the current discussion:
They provide [1] certain grounds (race, sex, age, etc.) on which
distinctions should not be made [2] by certain persons (maybe
public authorities, legislatures or maybe anyone at all) when dealing
with [3] certain people (employees, applicants for jobs, tenants,
citizens, etc.) [4] in respect of certain benefits or burdens (jobs,
houses, access to the courts, etc.).92
This Article is concerned with the ground of age, and with distinctions drawn
by either public or private entities. Public age discrimination is the wrongful
use of age classifications by the state through its legislative, judicial, and
executive branches.93 In contrast, private discrimination is wrongful
differential treatment by individual actors.94 It should be noted that this
Article does not seek to reopen constitutional debates on the appropriate
level of scrutiny for age; however, the argument presented in Part II helps
illuminate why those debates settled in the way they did.95 Finally, the
Article is concerned with anyone who is subject to age discrimination,
whether young or old, with respect to the variety of substantive fields in
which it occurs.
There are two main sources of antidiscrimination law. The first is the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, which denies the government
the ability to engage in certain forms of distinction-drawing.96 The Supreme
Court long ago held that age-based classifications are only subject to rational

91 See id. at 103 (“By claiming that something makes an act of discrimination wrong, . .
. I mean that it is a feature of the action that counts as a reason in favor of its being
impermissible to perform.”). Other normative arguments for or against age discrimination or
age discrimination law might operate in a different normative register. See, e.g., Samuel
Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The
ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780 (1997) (arguing that age discrimination
law is a mismatch with the situation of older workers); Jolls, supra note 30, at 1829–30
(justifying age discrimination laws on the basis of economic efficiency).
92 Elisa Holmes, Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality, 68 MOD. L. REV. 175, 182
(2005).
93 See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution in Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 7 (1991) (discussing the public/private distinction in the context of discrimination).
94 See id.
95 See infra Part II.B.
96 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
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basis review, making most age-based law permissible.97 The second source
of antidiscrimination law is statutory. There are a number of statutes that
prohibit discrimination on the basis of age. One of the most salient at the
federal level is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which prohibits
many employment decisions based solely on age for those over the age of
40.98 Similarly, the Age Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination on the
basis of age in any program receiving federal financial assistance.99 While
at the federal level, age has not been included in the Fair Housing Act, some
states have explicit age-based antidiscrimination protections in the realm of
housing.100 Additionally, age is sometimes read into the relevant state
antidiscrimination statute even if age is not explicitly mentioned.101
Most scholars see antidiscrimination laws and norms as grounded in the
value of equality.102 Equality is capable of many meanings, but at its core it
is inherently comparative. In order to evaluate whether the dictates of
equality are satisfied, one must compare her situation to that of another
person who is similarly situated.103 While there is a general consensus on
this value foundation and comparative method, there is significant
disagreement among discrimination theorists about what feature of the
equality-based comparison is relevant and which conception of equality is
operative in demonstrating the wrongfulness of that feature. In other words,
there is disagreement about what version of equality is relevant for the

97 See Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that police
officers over the age of fifty did not constitute a suspect class).
98
See 29 U.S.C. §623 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age”).
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012) (“[N]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (West 2016) (including a variety of identity categories but
omitting age). See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c (West 2017) (prohibiting the
refusal to sell or rent because of age); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (West 2016) (same).
101 See, e.g., Pizarro v. Lamb’s Players Theatre, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 861 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (noting that while age is not explicitly protected in the statute, age discrimination may
still contravene it under certain circumstances).
102 See, e.g., Zatz, supra note 21, at 1367 (analyzing equality law as if it were
antidiscrimination law); John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in
Perspective: Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583 (1994) (exploring equality
in the employment discrimination context). See also SEN, supra note 19, at 3 (“[T]he major
ethical theories of social arrangement all share an endorsement of equality in terms of some
focal variable, even though the variables that are selected are frequently very different
between one theory and another.”).
103 See Hellman, supra note 20, at 900 (“According to the comparative conception of
discrimination, we determine whether X has suffered wrongful discrimination by looking at
the treatment X has received . . . and comparing it to the treatment accorded to at least one
other individual.”).
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discrimination analysis and which feature of differential treatment
transforms it into wrongful discrimination.
Under the equality umbrella, there are three general camps.104 First,
there are those who are focused on intent. These thinkers draw upon the
concept of moral or basic equality, or the notion that each person has equal
moral worth and deserves equal respect and concern.105 On this view, when
an actor engages in differential treatment, it is wrongful to the extent that
such treatment is the result of a morally defective attitude that some are
worthier than others, or deserving of more or less respect and concern.106
This type of prejudice can make private acts of discrimination wrongful,
but it can also taint legal rules if such prejudice animates or infects the
democratic process.107 This understanding of the wrongfulness of public
discrimination developed in the context of Equal Protection jurisprudence,
specifically Footnote Four of Carolene Products. It reads: “[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”108 Thus, when legislators
actualize their prejudice in the public sphere by targeting minorities for
disadvantageous legal treatment, it reveals that those legislators do not think
those minorities are worthy of equal concern and respect.109 This represents
a breakdown in the democratic process as there is inadequate representation

104

See LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, supra note 62, at 7–8 (understanding the three general
categories as mental state, objective meaning, and harm).
105 See JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 1–
2 (2017) (terming this form of equality “basic equality”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 227 (1977) (describing “the right to treatment as an equal, which is the right, not
to receive the same distribution of some burden or benefit, but to be treated with the same
respect and concern as anyone else”).
106 See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 192 (1992) (“Biases—except
for those reflecting close personal ties that are so central to one’s identity they amount to
“biases” in favor of one-self—are paradigmatically intrinsically immoral. Biases rest on
erroneous judgments of others’ inferior moral worth.”).
107 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 158
(1980) (discussing when generalizations are suspect based on “who came up with it and
whether it serves their interests”).
108 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
109 See ELY, supra note 107, at 82 (noting that Equal Protection “preclude[s] a refusal to
represent [minorities], the denial to minorities of what Professor Ronald Dworkin has called
‘equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that
govern them.’”). See also Michael J. Perry, Two Constitutional Rights, Two Constitutional
Controversies, 50 CONN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019) (“The right to moral equality entails
not only that government may not deny to any human being the status of citizenship based on
the view (or on a sensibility to the effect) that she is morally inferior; it also entails the right
to equal citizenship: Government may not disadvantage any citizen based on the view that
she is morally inferior.”).
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of minority interests, which justifies judicial review.110 Accordingly, there
is a strong emphasis on discovering the “mental state” of Congress when it
passes such rules.111
The second camp of equality theorists focuses not on the intent of the
actor, but on what is communicated by the differential treatment.112 These
expressive accounts also draw upon the idea of basic or moral equality.
According to these assessments, discrimination is wrong when it demeans,
where demeaning treatment expresses the idea that another does not possess
equal moral worth.113 The act of demeaning has both a social dimension and
a power dimension. The social dimension requires establishing that a
specific act is a particularly serious or extreme expression of disrespect
toward another within a particular cultural and historical context.114 The
power dimension requires that the person or entity engaging in the
differential treatment hold a position of power with respect to the object of
the act, as demeaning involves someone higher in the power hierarchy
targeting someone lower in it.115 The government clearly qualifies as it has
the coercive power of the state behind it, but other entities or individuals
might as well, such as an employer who has power over employees or a
landlord who has power over tenants.116
The third group of egalitarian theorists shifts the focus to the negative
and unequal consequences of differential treatment. The basic logic of this
family of theories is that discrimination is wrongful when it harms on the

See ELY, supra note 107, at 136 (“Benefits . . . that are not essential to political
participation or guaranteed by the language of the Constitution, we can call constitutionally
gratuitous . . . and malfunction in their distribution can intelligibly inhere only in the process
that effected it.”).
111 See id. at 136–45 (discussing the difficulties of discerning legislative and
administrative motivation). See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976)
(discussing the importance of discriminatory purpose in assessing the constitutionality of
laws).
112 See HELLMAN, supra note 88, at 33 (“Discrimination is wrong when it demeans. . . .
What [this requires] is that laws, policies, and practices not draw distinctions among people
in a way that treats some as less worthy than others, however that is interpreted in that
culture.”); Patrick Shin, The Substantive Principle of Equal Treatment, 15 LEGAL THEORY
149, 166 (2009) (arguing for a similar moral analysis of how “treatment can be interpreted for
purposes of determining whether it is objectionable.”).
113 See HELLMAN, supra note 88, at 33 (“To demean is to treat another as less worthy. In
this sense, demeaning is an inherently comparative concept. . . . This account neither reduces
equality to an entitlement to a specific good or right nor leaves it empty of bite or content.”).
114 See id. at 36.
115 See id. at 35 (discussing several examples of power relationships changing the
meaning of a given act).
116 See id. at 57 (“Individual actions are less likely to demean than actions by institutions.
This is because governments and institutions generally have more status and power than
private individuals.”).
110
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basis of morally irrelevant characteristics.117 Scholars in this camp are
perhaps the most diverse, often appealing either to distributive equality—the
idea that benefits and burdens should be distributed equally in society—or
social or relational equality—the view that society should be free from
hierarchical relationships or beliefs of moral superiority.118
Further, this groups of theorists highlights different aspects of the harm
in the discrimination analysis. Some emphasize harms of distribution, or
how discrimination produces unequal allocations of resources or
opportunities.119 Others focus on the harms of recognition, which are “rooted
in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication.”120
Early writers in this vein saw the primary harm as one of stigma, or the
psychological effects of unequal legal and cultural treatment.121 While these
various harms may accrue to individuals, many of these theories expressly
take the wrong of discrimination to be based in how it negatively affects
social groups, which can affect the temporal equality analysis.122 One highly
influential view articulates this as an “anti-caste principle,” which objects to
discriminatory rules when they have the effect of transforming “highly

117 See LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, supra note 62, at 154–55 (“The harm-based account of the
wrongness of discrimination says that an instance of discrimination is wrong, when it is,
because it makes people worse off, i.e. they are worse off given the presence of discrimination
than they would have been in some suitable alternative situation in which the relevant
discrimination had not taken place.”); Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1979) (“Because race is
not a factor indicating anything about the moral worth of persons, race is morally irrelevant
to state laws and policies.”).
118 See IWAO HIROSE, EGALITARIANISM 1 (2015) (“Egalitarianism: a class of
distributive principles, which claim that individuals should have equal quantities of wellbeing or morally relevant factors that affect their life.”); Samuel Scheffler, The Practice of
Equality, in SOCIAL EQUALITY: ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE EQUALS 21, 21–22 (Carina Fourie
et al. eds., 2015) (distinguishing between distributive equality and a relational or social view
of equality).
119 See FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS 13–14 (1997) (describing the many forms of socioeconomic injustice that these harms represent). See also Re’em Segev, Making Sense of
Discrimination, 27 RATIO JURIS 47, 59–64 (2014) (arguing that discrimination is wrongful
when it results in distributive injustice).
120 FRASER, supra note 119, at 14.
121 See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1976) (“Decisions based on assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective
indifference inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their victims as inferior.”). See also
IYIOLA SOLANKE, DISCRIMINATION AS STIGMA: A THEORY OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 84
(2017) (“[T]he anti-stigma principle should be informed not only by structures of power, but
also by patterns of consequences, so as to accommodate the difference between those stigma
that will be protected by anti-discrimination law and those that will not.”).
122 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS
107, 147–56 (1976) (advancing a group-disadvantaging principle); infra Part II.B.3
(analyzing how group-based theories may evade the temporal question).
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visible and morally irrelevant characteristics into systematic social
disadvantage across several spheres of life.”123
The moral wrongfulness of a given act of discrimination serves as the
normative foundation for the prohibition of certain legal classifications or
the legal regulation of private discriminatory conduct. However, it is merely
one factor in deciding how to structure the law. While the wrongmaking
feature identified by a discrimination theory may make a certain instance of
differential treatment wrongful all other things being equal, there may be
other normative considerations that counsel against legal intervention.124 For
example, consider an individual who discriminates on the basis of race in the
selection of romantic partners.125 While this might be morally wrongful,
most would balk at the suggestion that the law intervene to prevent
discrimination in this domain. Romantic partner selection is typically
shielded from state intervention, as maintaining a sphere of privacy in
personal decision-making may be morally worthwhile as a general rule.126
Even if an act or rule is morally wrongful all things considered, it may
further be impractical for the law to intervene. Taking the example above,
it would be quite difficult and costly for the state to police romantic partner
selection for the entire population. In this case, the moral wrongfulness may
be better addressed by cultural rather than legal interventions.127 Thus, while
the moral wrongfulness of a particular form of age discrimination weighs in
favor of its legal regulation, such regulation is not a foregone conclusion.
***
This Part has examined the socio-legal category of age, which possesses
unique temporal qualities. It has also surveyed discrimination law theory,
which typically relies on the value of equality. This value requires a
comparative method to establish the wrongfulness of discrimination, which

123

See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411–12

(1994).
124 See, e.g., Axel Gosseries, What Makes Age Discrimination Special? A Philosophical
Look at ECJ Case Law, 43 NETHERLANDS J. L. PHIL. 59, 79–80 (2014) (considering some of
the additional arguments why differential treatment based on age may be acceptable).
125 See generally CHRISTIAN RUDDER, DATACLYSM: LOVE, SEX, RACE, AND IDENTITY
(2014) (reporting on data from OKCupid that indicated strong racial and age preferences in
the dating market); Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, LGBT Equality and Sexual
Racism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2739, 2742 (2018) (defining these preferences as sexual
racism).
126 See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”).
127 See generally LAN CAO, CULTURE IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: NURTURING POSITIVE
CHANGE (2016) (discussing methods of cultural change).
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in turn serves as the basis for an antidiscrimination law or norm. The next
Part brings these two strands together, making the case that incorporating a
temporal analysis into the subject of age discrimination reveals the
significant weaknesses of equality-based theories.

II. EQUALITY AND TIME
Age discrimination is typically seen as less pernicious than other forms
of discrimination.128 This Part offers an argument why: Once the temporal
aspects of age are considered, egalitarian theories of discrimination prove
unable to identify the moral wrong of age discrimination in many cases. This
should not be taken as an argument that there is in fact nothing wrong with
ageism and age discrimination. Instead, it is meant to demonstrate that
equality alone cannot form the theoretical foundation of this area of law
precisely because it does not have the necessary conceptual resources to
isolate the wrong of ageism and age discrimination. To the extent that age
discrimination is wrong, we must understand its wrongfulness in terms of
other values.
Section A begins by describing how an egalitarian analysis requires
answering the temporal question of when the comparative analysis should
take place. It further presents the consensus answer to this question in
philosophy—that the lifetime of the individual is the relevant temporal unit
of analysis. Section B explores how this renders many equality-based
theories of discrimination law incapable or compromised in recognizing any
wrongfulness in age-based differential treatment. As a descriptive matter,
this explains the current Equal Protection jurisprudence on age, which
explicitly relies on the value of equality. Section C describes the situations
in which equality might still decry age discrimination, though these fail to
capture many cases of age discrimination. Therefore, equality is insufficient
to justify the current statutory antidiscrimination regime or to ground an
understanding of the wrongfulness of age discrimination more generally.
A. The Temporal Question
Because equality is a comparative value, it requires an analysis of at least
two objects to allow that comparison to proceed. Courts have focused on the
128 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 205, 222 (2004) (“[T]he prohibition on age discrimination in employment does not
have anything like the same moral standing as the corresponding prohibitions on race and
sex discrimination.”); Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things Is Not Like the Other:
Analogizing Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REV.
839, 852 (2004) (noting that age discrimination “does not elicit the same universal
agreement that age distinctions are immoral.”).
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“Who?” element of the comparison. In deciding antidiscrimination cases,
many courts and legal commentators have tried to determine whether a
comparator is required for a successful antidiscrimination claim and who the
appropriate comparator might be.129 Philosophers have focused on the
“What” element of the comparison. In examining whether a particular
outcome is just according to the value of equality, the key question is what
we are trying to equalize—resources, utility, capabilities, or something
else?130
Age forces us to explore the under-examined “When” element of the
comparison.131 The central question is this: what should be the temporal unit
of analysis for equality? Specifically, in evaluating differential treatment,
do we assess whether that treatment comports with equality based on a
moment in time or over a longer time period? The lifetime egalitarianism
approach posits that the complete life of an individual is the morally relevant
temporal unit.132 Thus, there must be equality over the complete lifetimes of
separate individuals.133 At any given moment in time, there might be
inequalities between individuals, but these may be allowed, justified, or
perhaps even required to ensure equality over lifetimes.134

See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) (noting that “side-by-side
comparisons” of black and white jurors would be relevant to ascertaining race discrimination
in jury selection pursuant to a Batson challenge); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 804 (1993) (noting that employee comparators would be helpful in establishing
employer motive); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728,
748 (2011) (“Comparators become relevant to the analysis, then, because they help expose—
whether in the single- or mixed-motive analysis—that “likes” have been treated in an “unlike”
fashion and give rise to the inference that discrimination is the reason for that
differentiation.”).
130 See G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 906 (1989)
(“What aspect(s) of a person’s condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians .
. . ?”); Amartya K. Sen, Equality of What?, in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES
195, 197 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980) (initiating the debate on equality of what?). See
also Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN
ANTHOLOGY 270, 283 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3d ed. 2008) (discussing the different
currencies of well-being).
131 See PETER LASLETT AND JAMES FISHKIN, JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND
GENERATIONS 1 (1992) (noting that the “revival of political theory over the past three decades
has taken place within the grossly simplifying assumptions of a largely timeless world.”).
132 See LARRY TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 233 (1989) (“[O]n a complete lives view, an
egalitarian should be concerned about A’s being worse off than B to the extent, and only to
the extent, that A’s life, taken as a complete whole, is worse than B’s, taken as a complete
whole.”) (emphasis in original).
133 See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING LIVES 117–139 (2004) (arguing for the separability of
lives).
134 See NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS’ KEEPER?: AN ESSAY ON JUSTICE BETWEEN
THE YOUNG AND OLD 83–95 (1988) (defending age rationing in health care and employment
in situations of scarcity based on his Prudential Lifespan Account, a Rawlsian interpretation
of the lifetime view). See also MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION:
BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 430–42 (2011) (arguing for lifetime prioritarianism).
129
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The main alternative to lifetime egalitarianism is the time-slice
approach.135 This family of views holds that the relevant temporal unit of
analysis is something shorter than entire lifetimes. Thus, egalitarians should
be concerned about inequalities that manifest in either simultaneous slices of
time across lives, corresponding slices of time within each life, or nontemporally-ranked slices of time within each life.136 In other words, those
momentary inequalities that are permitted or required in lifetime
egalitarianism should instead be seen as morally troubling.137
Most philosophers have accepted or assumed that the complete life of an
individual is the morally relevant temporal unit.138 There are at least four
reasons why this is the case. First, the lifetime view has a certain intuitive
and administrative appeal. We often consider our lives as having a “narrative
unity,” with meaningful relationships between different temporal segments

See Dennis McKerlie, Equality and Time, 99 ETHICS 475, 491 (1989) (“Our lives are
lived serially through time, and the simultaneous segments view responds to this fact by
valuing equality in the simultaneous parts of lives rather than by merely requiring that lives
should be equal when viewed timelessly as completed wholes.”).
136 See TEMKIN, supra note 132, at 233 (describing simultaneous segments egalitarianism
(where simultaneous time slice segments are the moral unit of concern), and corresponding
segments egalitarianism (where corresponding time slice segments—youth, middle age, old
age, for example—of an individual’s life are the moral unit of concern); Kasper LippertRasmussen, Measuring the Disvalue of Inequality over Time, 69 THEORIA 32, 36 (2003)
(adding a third time-slice view of non-time based segments egalitarianism, in which segments
of life are compared using some non-temporal measure, such as peaks or lows of welfare).
137
Those who argue against the lifetime view often use examples of extreme inequalities
in slices of time to illustrate their point. See, e.g., DENNIS MCKERLIE, JUSTICE BETWEEN THE
YOUNG AND THE OLD 6–7 (2013) (describing a wealthy apartment complex next to a retirement
home whose residents live in squalor); TEMKIN, supra note 132, at 235–36 (describing how a
hypothetical God allows two versions of Job to possess vastly different levels of welfare, only
to have their positions switch at the midpoint of their lives). These examples undoubtedly
capture some egalitarian intuitions, though these intuitions may derive from violations of
relational, rather than distributive equality. See, e.g., Juliana Bidadanure, Making Sense of
Age Group Justice: A Time for Relational Equality?, 15 PHIL. POL. & ECON. 234 (2016)
(noting that what might worry us about such examples is “not that there is a timeslice
inequality in distribution as such, but rather that relationships of inequality may pertain at all
times.”). Alternatively, as this Article suggests, it may be that these examples demonstrate a
different problem, which is that these examples represent violations of a non-comparative
value such as liberty or dignity.
138 See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 69 (1991) (“Remember that the
subject of an egalitarian principle is not the distribution of particular rewards to individuals at
some time, but the prospective quality of their lives as a whole, from birth to death.”); R. I.
Sikora, Six Viewpoints for Assessing Egalitarian Distribution Schemes, 99 ETHICS 492, 502
(1989) (arguing that from various differing perspectives individuals should prefer the lifetime
view); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 283, 304–05 (1981) (describing the goal as equality of resources across the lives of each
person); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 78 (1971) (claiming that individuals behind the
veil of ignorance would make decisions based on the long-term life prospects that they might
face).
135
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that make up our story.139 This is also reflected culturally at the time of
death, when the relevant question is whether a person had a good life rather
than a good part of a life.140 This tendency towards lifetime thinking is
reflected in a vexing problem for the time-slice approach, which is its
difficulty in pinpointing a sub-lifetime period that is morally relevant—one
hour, one month, one year, one decade?141 As a practical matter, if the length
of time is defined to be very short, we ignore many of the contextual facts
that might be relevant to assessing equality. For example, if the relevant time
slice were one hour, and it happens that one individual had to have a root
canal that hour, we might be required to compensate her for the pain and cost
of that procedure and ignore that others might go through the same
experience the next day.142 As the unit of analysis becomes larger, the
conceptual distinction between the time-slice and lifetime views is
diminished, and we lose the ability to capture inequalities at moments in
time.143 Whatever size segment is chosen, it will likely be morally arbitrary
yet have significant effects on evaluating equality between individuals.144
The lifetime view provides a simpler and more elegant solution.
A second reason why the lifetime view might be superior is because it
incorporates a desirable compensation principle. This is the notion that
inequalities in one segment of a person’s life can be compensated for in
another part of that person’s life.145 For example, putting in hard work at law

139 See HELEN SMALL, THE LONG LIFE 95 (2007) (“‘[N]arrative unity’ tends to be
understood non-literally, and simplifyingly, as a matter of there being significant connections
between the different temporal parts or stages of a story and by analogy a life.”). This is
reinforced by the psychological interconnectedness of different parts of our lives, such that
we might experience pleasure or dread while imagining the future, which affects us in the
present. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 972 (1999) (discussing the dread
effects of environmental contagion).
140 See Connie S. Rosati, The Story of a Life, 30 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 21, 22–23 (2013)
(noting how we understand our lives in complete narrative form).
141 See Juliana Bidadanure, On Dennis McKerlie’s Equality and Time, 125 ETHICS 1174,
1177 (2015). (“One problem is that [simultaneous segments egalitarianism] may seem to
define the segments that matter (T1, T2, and T3) arbitrarily. In theory, we may always select
smaller segments in which case defining the worse-off would become arbitrary. By contrast,
complete lives egalitarians seem to have identified the least arbitrary segment to apply the
value of equality to: the segment of a life.”).
142 See McKerlie, supra note 135, at 483 (using the dentist example but not finding it
damning).
143 See id.
144 See Larry S. Temkin, Determining the Scope of Egalitarian Concern: A Partial
Defense of Complete Lives Egalitarianism, 69 THEORIA 46, 55–59 (2003) (critiquing timeslice approaches for arbitrariness that has a large effect on evaluations of equality).
145 See KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, LUCK EGALITARIANISM 154 (2016) (arguing that
the possibility of compensation is a benefit to the lifetime view); Dennis McKerlie, Justice
Between the Young and Old, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 152, 154 (2002) (discussing the
compensation principle).
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school while taking on student loan debt could be worthwhile if it enhances
one’s employment and earning prospects for the rest of one’s life.146 Or a
couple might adopt a rule that each partner would be able to choose which
movie to watch on Fridays in alternating turns. This represents an inequality
in power each Friday, but this inequality disappears over time in a way that
most egalitarians would find acceptable. In contrast, the time-slice view
would only accept compensation if it occurred within the same temporal
segment. Thus, it would fail to recognize longer-term life plans that involved
tradeoffs in well-being at different parts of the lifecourse.
Third, the lifetime view recognizes the importance of history. Consider
two individuals who experience vastly different life circumstances for the
first seventy years of their lives, and each have one decade left to live. The
first has had a life full of opportunities, happiness, and resources, while the
second has experienced health problems, social isolation, and poverty
through no fault of her own. According to the lifetime view, we should not
treat these two individuals equally in the last decade of their lives.147 Rather,
we should try to better the situation of the second individual to account for
what she has been through, in an attempt to achieve equality over their
lifetimes. The time-slice view might force us to ignore that historical
context, which potentially inhibits societal efforts to recognize and address
persistent inequalities.
Finally, the lifetime view allows for some consideration of personal
responsibility and choice.148 Many versions of egalitarianism prefer
distributive equality between people except when inequalities are due to
voluntary choices made by those people.149 Consider another two
individuals. Both experience roughly equal and good lives in terms of
welfare, but one individual decides on a whim to sell all her possessions and
spend the money on lottery tickets. She does not win the lottery, leaving her

146 See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43
J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 284 (2014) (finding that “a law degree is associated with an increase of
approximately 84 percent in expected mean monthly earnings . . . , a 65 percent increase in
mean hourly wages . . . , and reduced risk of unemployment or underemployment.”)
147 See id.
148 See Paul Bou-Habib, Distributive Justice, Dignity, and the Lifetime View, 37 SOC.
THEORY & PRAC. 285 (2011) (“It is widely accepted among theorists of justice that a person’s
claims of distributive justice at a given moment in time should sometimes reflect her earlier
exercises of responsibility.”).
149 See SHLOMI SEGALL, WHY INEQUALITY MATTERS: LUCK EGALITARIANISM, ITS
MEANING AND VALUE 23–24 (2016) (defending equality as intrinsically valuable so long as
inequalities derive only from the fault of one’s own actions); Larry Temkin, Equality, Priority,
and the Levelling Down Objection, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 126, 129 (Matthew Clayton &
Andrew Williams eds., 2000) (“[Egalitarians] care about undeserved, nonvoluntary,
inequalities, which they regard as bad, or objectionable, because unfair.”).
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destitute.150 If we assess these two individuals solely at this point in time, or
within only a narrower temporal frame, we would have to bring the second
person back to equality with the first. For those who care about incorporating
some notion of desert or responsibility into distributions (and not all
egalitarians do), lifetime egalitarianism allows for that.151
For these reasons, in evaluating differential treatment from the
perspective of equality, it is necessary to evaluate whether such treatment
leads to equality across the entire lives of separate individuals. This may at
first seem to be in tension with a traditional legal analysis, which naturally
adopts a time-slice approach by analyzing the outcomes of individual
cases.152 However, cases help to form legal rules that will impact parties and
controversies in the future beyond that case. The broader temporal
perspective is useful for examining whether legal rules accomplish over time
the more substantive policy goals for which they were designed. This is
particularly important in the discrimination context, as the pernicious effects
of discriminatory laws and private actions might only be revealed when one
examines how they impose cumulative disadvantage on members of
particular social groups over time.153
Thus, age’s temporal dimension requires us to expand our analytical
window when engaging in the comparative exercise. When considering the
wrongfulness of a given age-based legal rule, we must examine how that rule
will apply through time to the lifecourses of all individuals who would live
long enough to see its application. When considering the wrongfulness of
private differential treatment based on age, we must examine how that
treatment would apply to that individual or other individuals at ages across
the lifespan. The next Section examines how lifetime egalitarianism affects
equality-based theories of discrimination.

150 See Vanessa McGrady, It’s Math: Why You Should Never Play the Lottery, FORBES
(Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/vanessamcgrady/2016/01/08/powerball/
(describing how poor the odds are of winning the lottery).
151 See MCKERLIE, supra note 137, at 31 (“So it seems that, to give proper weight to facts
about choice and responsibility, we must be prepared in principle to consider the past and the
future when assessing a present inequality.”).
152 See Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L.
REV. 517, 520–541 (1991) (describing the institutionalization of the case method in legal
teaching).
153 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 487 (2007) (“[E]ven rational acts of discrimination can aggregate
to cause systematic and cumulative disadvantage to members of minority groups.”); Brest,
supra note 121, at 8 (“[B]ecause acts of discrimination tend to occur in pervasive patterns,
their victims suffer especially frustrating, cumulative and debilitating injuries.”). See also
Anne L. Alstott, A New Deal for Old Age, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1933, 1936 (2017) (noting how
earning a low income disadvantages you across the lifecourse).
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B. Lifetime Egalitarianism
The Supreme Court first seriously engaged with age-based legal rules in
the case of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.154 This case
involved a Massachusetts state law that required mandatory retirement of
police officers at age fifty.155 Robert Murgia challenged the law, and there
was no dispute that his “excellent physical and mental health still rendered
him capable of performing the duties of a uniformed officer.”156 While
noting that the aged faced discrimination, the Court declined to apply strict
scrutiny to the class of police officers over fifty, saying that “even old age
does not define a ‘discrete and insular’ group in need of ‘extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process.’ Instead, it marks a stage
that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span.”157 As a result, the
mandatory retirement rule passed constitutional muster under rational basis
review. Other similar age-based constitutional challenges have also
failed.158
The Court did not spend much time on the temporal dimension of age,
but the above quote reveals that the Court implicitly embraced a lifetime
egalitarian approach.159 Since the Court was constrained by its consideration
of age distinctions in the context of constitutional jurisprudence, however, it
did not engage with the moral wrongfulness of age discrimination in
egalitarian theories of discrimination. The next subsections explicitly
engage in that missing analysis, concluding that the rational basis level of
scrutiny adopted by the Court was likely appropriate from the perspective of
equality.
1. Intent
Age-based differential treatment or legal rules might offend equality
because they are infected with ageism. In this context, ageism refers to its
prejudice or stereotyping components, which have the quality of not

154

Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
See id. at 308.
156 Id. at 311.
157 Id. at 313–14 (citation omitted).
158 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (mandatory retirement for judges at 70
falls within exception of ADEA and does not violate equal protection); Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93 (1979) (mandatory retirement for foreign service officers at age 60 permissible under
the Equal Protection Clause). However, some state courts have struck down age distinctions
under rational basis review. See, e.g., Arneson v. State By & Through Dep’t of Admin.,
Teachers’ Ret. Div., 864 P.2d 1245, 1249 (Mont. 1993) (striking down a retirement benefit
age distinction).
159 See Eglit, supra note 40, at 888–89 (discussing how the court employed a logic of
complete lives).
155
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respecting the equal moral worth of individuals in society.160 According to
this line of argument, what makes differential treatment by private actors
morally wrongful is that it is animated by this ageist mental state. However,
ageism differs from racism and sexism in that it is composed of temporallytriggered biases that have equal application across all individuals’
lifetimes.161 For example, consider an employer who believes that people in
their twenties are unreliable because of their age and as a result refuses to
hire them.162 This seems to treat people of that disfavored age as unworthy,
which in turn taints the refusal to hire. However, widening the temporal lens
reveals that this mental state does in fact respect the equal moral worth of
persons, as the aforementioned employer would presumably consider hiring
the same individuals as they age.163
A comparison to other identity characteristics helps to illustrate the point.
A racist attitude does not expire as applied to a given individual, unless one
has the privilege to “pass” from one racial category to another unbeknownst
to the individual possessing the racist attitude.164 Therefore, the lifetime
view reveals that differential treatment animated by racism will generally
yield continuous discrimination over the lifetime of one person as compared
to another.165 This is lifetime inequality, not equality. Differential treatment
animated by religious bias, while potentially more mutable like ageist bias,
does not inevitably change in application to a given individual, as conversion
is neither required nor guaranteed. Thus, in contrast to age, this yields
lifetime inequality as well.
In the realm of public discrimination, the argument from intent takes on
a slightly different character. What matters here is that ageism taints the
160 See supra Part I.A. (discussing ageism); Part II.B.1. (discussing intent-based theories
of discrimination).
161 See Reaves, supra note 128, at 51 (noting the differences between ageism and racism
in the employment discrimination context).
162 See Caroline Beaton, Too Young to Lead? When Youth Works Against You, FORBES
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinebeaton/2016/11/11/too-young-tolead-when-youth-works-against-you/ (describing how workers under thirty can face
discrimination based on age).
163 See Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Age Thirty:
Where It’s Been, Where It Is Today, Where It’s Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 676 (1997)
(“Ageism is not equivalent, either in its genesis nor its manifestations, to racism.”).
164 See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 47 (1994) (“Passing—the
ability of individuals to change race—powerfully indicates race’s chosen nature.”). See also
Khaled A. Beydoun & Erika K. Wilson, Reverse Passing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 282, 347–52
(2017) (examining transracialism and its relationship to reverse passing); Rebecca Tuvel, In
Defense of Transracialism, 32 HYPATIA 263 (2017) (considering the phenomenon of racial
transition and comparing it to the transgender experience).
165 See, e.g., John Wooldredge et al., Is the Impact of Cumulative Disadvantage on
Sentencing Greater for Black Defendants?, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 187, 212–17
(2015) (noting the negative effects for black defendants at various stages of the criminal
process).
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political process, producing normatively objectionable outcomes that do not
equally represent the interests and concerns of age minorities in a
democracy. When one observes the age-based legal landscape, it does
appear that a nontrivial number of age-based rules reflect ageist stereotypes:
those younger than twenty-one are presumed unable to drink alcohol
responsibly,166 those under twenty-five are presumed to lack the life
experience to serve as Representatives,167 and those who are fifty and older
are presumed incompetent to serve as police officers.168 Further, age-based
rules typically concern the youngest or oldest members of society, who are
numerical minorities.169 This suggests that ageism may have infected the
political process, and the interests of these groups have not been adequately
represented.
The unique temporal character of age, however, also complicates any
analysis of the political process as ageist. Ageism not only represents
negative attitudes and feelings towards other people but also represents
prejudice against one’s past or future self.170 This understanding of ageism
makes the application of an intent theory to public discrimination less

166 See Judith G. McMullen, Underage Drinking: Does Current Policy Make Sense?, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 333, 341–42 (2006) (discussing the policy rationales for the drinking
age being to protect minors and protect society).
167 See Scott Bomboy, Why Does a Presidential Candidate Need to be 35 Years Old
Anyway?, CONST. DAILY (July 22, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/why-does-apresidential-candidate-need-to-be-35-years-old-anyway (describing the discussions that led
to the constitutional age restrictions for elective office).
168
See Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315 (1976) (“Since physical
ability generally declines with age, mandatory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police
service those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively has diminished with age.”).
169 See Bernice L. Neugarten, Age Distinctions and Their Social Functions, 57 CHI.KENT L. REV. 809, 821 (1981) (discussing a study that found that the vast majority of Illinois
statutory law concerned minors or those above fifty).
170 See Todd D. Nelson, Ageism: Prejudice Against Our Feared Future Self, 61 J. SOC.
ISSUES 207, 213–14 (2005) (discussing the psychological mechanisms at play in sustaining
ageism). This formulation of ageism relies on the concept of continuous personal identity,
i.e. that the past or future self is indeed the same person as the one who holds the ageist
attitude. See, e.g., ERIC T. OLSON, THE HUMAN ANIMAL: PERSONAL IDENTITY WITHOUT
PSYCHOLOGY (1997) (arguing for continuity based on biology); Sydney Shoemaker, Personal
Identity: A Materialist’s Account, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 67, 89–91 (Sydney Shoemaker &
Richard Swinburne eds., 1984) (advocating for psychological continuity); Ho Mun Chan,
Sharing Death and Dying: Advance Directives, Autonomy and the Family, 18 BIOETHICS 87,
99–100 (2004) (favoring a relational view of personal identity). But see Derek Parfit,
REASONS AND PERSONS 205–12 (1984) (arguing that personal identity is more a matter of
degree rather than being an all-or-nothing affair). Despite this philosophical controversy,
many legal doctrines rely on the idea of continuous personal identity. See Nancy K. Rhoden,
The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 845, 854 (1990) (“The principle ‘one body,
one person’ is a virtual necessity for the criminal justice system, for duties to honor one’s
contracts, or to pay for one’s torts. Without unified personal identity, ‘new persons’ could
spring fully formed into existence and legitimately could deny all family and financial
obligations.”).
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straightforward than it might at first seem. From the perspective of intent
and process, age-based legislating appears to be less about inadequate
representation of the interests of other age groups in society at one moment
in time and more about the failure to represent our own past or future
interests across the lifecourse. In other words, age-based legislating merely
represents a lack of foresight or hindsight.171
Legislating against oneself, however, shows no defect of political
process. This is why affirmative action, which draws distinctions to the
detriment of the racial majority, is not troublesome from the perspective of
this egalitarian theory.172 The failure to think ahead or remember our pasts
is not unique to age-based rules, either, so it fails to provide a unique
rationale for the moral wrongfulness of age-based distinctions in this
context.173 These types of laws may still be unwise or expose the problems
with mental heuristics humans employ, but these are separate prudential
rather than moral considerations.
2. Meaning
While an intent-based inquiry focuses on the process through which
differential treatment came about, objective meaning accounts shift the
emphasis to the differential treatment itself. What makes discrimination
wrongful is the demeaning message that such treatment might express in a
particular context.174 To be demeaning, a particular instance of differential
treatment must come from a person or entity that has power over the person
to whom it applies (the power dimension), and the treatment itself must
express extreme disrespect that does not acknowledge the equal moral worth
of the individual in cultural context (the social dimension).175 The power
dimension will easily be satisfied by public discrimination because the
government has power over its subjects, and we can assume for the sake of
argument that at least some private actors will be in a position of power as
well.
The analysis is more complicated for the social dimension. Age-based
decision-making might at first seem to express extreme moral disrespect. In
171 See EGLIT, supra note 67, at 17 (2004) (“These facts lead to the perception that those
people who possess power in American society are not likely to exercise that power to hurt
themselves today or their future selves tomorrow. . . .”).
172 See ELY, supra note 107, at 170–72 (discussing how affirmative action is not
troublesome from a process theory).
173 See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability
in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 99 (1995) (discussing failures in judgment of both
foresight and hindsight); Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight and Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305, 306 (1975)
(discussing hindsight bias).
174 See supra Part I.B.2. (discussing the objective meaning accounts).
175 See HELLMAN, supra note 88, at 33.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3276514

AGE, TIME, AND DISCRIMINATION

31

the public realm, consider the various maturity rules that grant legal rights to
teenagers or those in their early twenties.176 These rules deprive various
individuals who might be developmentally mature of the ability to have sex,
contract, or vote because they are just short of turning sixteen, eighteen, or
twenty-one.177 Certainly to those individuals who are developmentally
mature but have not yet reached the appropriate age, this represents a
demeaning message that they are not full members of the community.178
Similarly, a denial of services in the private realm on the basis of age could
send a similar message.179
It is not clear, however, how these types of age-based public rules or
private treatment can contain demeaning messages once one evaluates them
from the lifetime perspective. Since expressive theories are heavily reliant
on analyzing the relevant context to determine if a message is demeaning, it
is consistent with this approach to consider the temporal context as well.180
In the case of maturity rules, minors will inevitably “age out” of these
restrictions. In the case of private age discrimination, the demeaning
treatment is temporally situated, such that it will not apply indefinitely and
will apply inevitably to all. Thus, when examined from the lifetime
perspective, treating individuals differently based on age merely expresses
that “This is not the appropriate time, yet” or “You are currently the wrong
age, but you were not before.” It is hard to construe this message as
inherently demeaning, provided there is consistency in application of the
differential treatment over time. This is notably different from other identity
characteristics, such as sex, religion, or disability, which are not temporally
dependent in the same way.
3. Harm
Meaning-based egalitarian theories of discrimination concentrate on the
objective content of the discriminatory action, but harm-based theories focus
instead on their consequences.181 Law serves as a way of distributing
resources or opportunities in society, and it also serves to shape or reinforce
176

See generally Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1149–50 (2012)
(detailing the various types of maturity rules and their relationship with cultural constructs).
177 See supra Part I.A (describing various age-based rules).
178 This was the essence of the dispute in the early 1970s around reducing the voting age
to eighteen, so that it was consonant with the age of the military draft, which was high-salience
due to the Vietnam War. See Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History
of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1358 (2003) (detailing the history).
179 See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 183, 264 (2011) (discussing how the Civil Rights Act was purposed towards avoiding
the demeaning nature of discrimination).
180 See HELLMAN, supra note 88, at 38–41 (discussing the importance of considering
context in evaluating social meaning).
181 See supra Part I.B.3 (describing harm-based theories).
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oppressive cultural attitudes and representations.182 The ruling in Murgia
did both.183 It permitted the allocation of government positions, in this case,
employment opportunities in law enforcement, to those who are under age
fifty. It also reinforced the stereotype that older people are physically weak
or incompetent.184 At first glance, this creates an inequality between those
who are over fifty and those who are under fifty, on the basis of an immutable
characteristic that does not inherently have a relationship with the ability to
do the job. To the extent that we are egalitarians, it would seem that we
should view this type of age-based distinction with suspicion.
This first take, however, again fails to take a lifetime perspective. As the
Murgia Court points out, “old age” merely represents a particular span of
time within the lifecourse of an individual.185 Everyone will have the same
opportunity to be a police officer because everyone will have that
opportunity for the same age range in their lives. Everyone will experience
the negative attitudes towards age and aging when they reach the appropriate
age, but not before. In addition, they might experience positive age-based
stereotypes as well, such as the presumption of wisdom or experience,
indicating that travel through the lifecourse is not necessarily a uniformly
negative trajectory.186 When you compare the access that two individuals
might have to lifetime employment opportunities in this field or the stigmatic
effects that one might experience over a lifetime, there is no difference.
From an egalitarian perspective, time serves to cure the negative effects of
the discrimination.
Those harm-based equality theories that focus on social groups, rather
than individuals, offer the possibility of avoiding the temporal problems of
age.187 These group-based theories of discrimination locate the wrong of
differential treatment in how it affects social groups or society as a whole.188
Age groups do not possess lifetimes, and it thus seems natural to evaluate

182 See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 92–93
(1996) (describing the mission of antidiscrimination law as ameliorating both distributive and
stigmatic harm).
183 See Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315 (1976).
184 See Leslie A. Zebrowitz & Joann M. Montepare, “Too Young, Too Old”: Stigmatizing
Adolescents and Elders, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STIGMA 334, 338–344 (Todd F.
Heatherton et al. eds. 2003) (discussing how age stigmas affect both those who are older and
younger).
185 See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313–14.
186 See PALMORE, supra note 68, at 34–44 (discussing the positive stereotypes, attitudes,
and discrimination experienced by those who are older).
187 See supra text accompanying notes 122–23.
188 See Carina Fourie et al., The Nature and Distinctiveness of Social Equality: An
Introduction, in SOCIAL EQUALITY: ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE EQUALS 1, 1 (Carina Fourie et
al. eds., 2015) (“When we appeal to the value of equality, we mean the value primarily of
egalitarian and nonhierarchical relationships”).
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whether legal rules or private discrimination negatively affect certain groups
in society in a time-slice fashion.189
There are two primary problems with such an approach, one specific to
age and one not. First, as we all inevitably progress through the lifecourse,
any given group of individuals defined by age is unstable as its membership
is constantly and systematically changing.190 People will always be naturally
progressing into a given age group (through birth or aging) and out of it
(through further aging or death). This is different from the changing
membership of other groups, which is either impossible due to lifetime
immutability, or occurs as a matter of choice or random chance. Thus, age
groups do not have the caste-like nature that concerns group theorists.191
Second, it is not clear that group harms adequately capture or exhaust the
wrong of discrimination, either morally or legally. This is a critique that is
not unique to age discrimination, though it takes on special resonance when
trying to assess moral wrongfulness. At least some portion of the moral
wrongfulness of discrimination derives from a personal wrong, as the rest of
the egalitarian theories of discrimination recognize. For example, most
understand the denial of employment, housing, or medical care to a person
on the basis her sex or class as being wrong not just because it contributes to
inequality between genders or classes writ large, but also because it
negatively impacts that individual.192 This is even truer of age, as individuals
have weaker ties to any given age group as they continue to change group
membership throughout their lives. Put another way, discrimination is more
tort-like in nature; it constitutes a personal wrong by one person to another,
or by the government against its subjects.193 This is also typically how
discrimination law has understood antidiscrimination rights—as individual
rather than group rights.194 This is not to suggest that social or relational
189

See Bidadanure, supra note 137.
See Sujit Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 145, 177 (2000) (highlighting that the group logic of
antidiscrimination laws exacerbates tensions between distributive and recognition-based
forms of justice).
191 See Sunstein, supra note 123, at 2411–12.
192 See Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 945–46
(2014) (emphasizing the importance of the individual as well as the group in sex
discrimination).
193 See Moreau, supra note 27, at 145–46 (“Anti-discrimination laws are commonly
structured in such a way as to suggest that discriminators have committed a personal wrong
against their victims, akin to a tort.”). See also William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling About
the Tortification of Employment Discrimination Law?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1032–33 (2014)
(describing the recent tendency of the Supreme Court to import tort concepts into
discrimination law).
194 See Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 141
(2017) (noting that equality law “must recognize social groups to understand how groupbased inequality constrains individuals and harms society. But it does not envision social
groups as the basic units of analysis or the bearers of rights.”).
190
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equality is not a worthy goal, but instead to highlight the fact that the moral
wrongfulness of discrimination does not start or end with groups, even if
they, too, might experience harm through discrimination.
***
Egalitarian theories of discrimination alone provide insufficient guidance
in understanding the moral wrongfulness of age discrimination. As a
descriptive matter, this fact is illuminating, as it helps explain the current
state of constitutional age discrimination jurisprudence, which is not
protective of age.195 In addition, there are powerful arguments why Equal
Protection jurisprudence should remain firmly rooted in equality rather than
in alternative values such as liberty.196 However, the fact that an age-based
rule is constitutionally permissible does not absolve us of the responsibility
to analyze whether age discrimination is wrongful or whether legislatures or
agencies should continue to adopt age-based rules or enact
antidiscrimination statutes. The flurry of age-based antidiscrimination
legislation after Murgia suggests that there is some moral understanding that
age discrimination can be wrongful and that the law has a role to play in
policing it.197 The next Section examines how equality might be able to
justify the legal regulation of age discrimination in a limited set of situations.
C. Equality’s Remainders
While age’s temporal dimension renders many egalitarian theories of
discrimination incapable of pinpointing the wrong of age-based
discrimination, it is not the case that equality excuses all forms of age-based
discrimination. There are at least two situations of age discrimination that
equality may have the theoretical power to identify as wrongful. However,
even recognizing equality’s utility in these cases, there are many forms of
age discrimination that are left unaddressed in an egalitarian scheme. Thus,
current age-based antidiscrimination law still requires a different or
supplemental theoretical foundation.

195

See supra note 158.
See Deborah Hellman, Equality and Unconstitutional Discrimination, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 51, 51 (“[A]n equality-based conception of wrongful
discrimination allows a court to decide cases on the basis of thinner principles than does a
liberty-based conception . . . and for that reason is more consistent with liberal
constitutionalism.”).
197 See Howard Eglit, Mandatory Retirement, Murgia, and Ageism, in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STORIES 268, 297–300 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed. 2006) (describing federal
legislative responses after Murgia).
196
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The first category is intersectional discrimination.198 In cases where age
intersects with other identity characteristics that do not have the same
temporal qualities as age, the lifetime perspective does not complicate the
egalitarian discrimination analysis.199 This is because the discrimination will
be anchored in more stable identity characteristics or ones that do not possess
the same inevitable mutability of age. As a result, several egalitarian theories
of discrimination will remain fully capable of explaining why these types of
discrimination are wrongful. For example, many states have moved to
decrease the age at which minors can be tried as adults in criminal courts,
with some going so far as to try children aged thirteen.200 To the extent that
this has disproportionate racial effects because such transfers operate in an
environment in which black children are seen as more mature and culpable,
it is not a neutral age-based distinction that will even out over the
lifecourse.201 The same can be said for raising the retirement age, which will
have a disproportionate impact on certain racial minorities and other
groups.202 Thus, intersectional discrimination will often show its wrongful
character through the disparate impact of facially neutral age rules.203
The second category is age-based discrimination that has the effect of
producing lifetime inequalities due to contextual factors.204 For example,
198

See supra text accompanying notes 80–84.
See, e.g., Alexandra Lopes, Aging and Social Class: Towards a Dynamic Approach
to Class Inequalities in Old Age, in AGE DISCRIMINATION AND DIVERSITY: MULTIPLE
DISCRIMINATION FROM AN AGE PERSPECTIVE 89, 101–05 (Malcolm Sargeant ed. 2011)
(discussing the intersection of class and age to produce cumulative disadvantage over the
lifecourse).
200 See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 96 (2006), available at
https://www.ojjdp.gov /ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf (discussing the trend); 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805 (permitting prosecution of thirteen year olds under certain
conditions).
201 See REBECCA EPSTEIN ET AL., GIRLHOOD INTERRUPTED: THE ERASURE OF BLACK
GIRLS’ CHILDHOOD (2017) (demonstrating that black girls are more likely to be “adultified”
and that this has implications for the juvenile justice system); Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The
Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERS. & SOC.
PSYCH. 526 (2014) (finding that black boys are seen as less childlike than their white peers).
202 See Kathryn L. Moore, Raising the Social Security Retirement Ages: Weighing the
Costs and Benefits, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 607 (2001) (“[R]aising the Social Security
retirement ages is likely to have a greater adverse impact on groups with lower life
expectancies, such as men, blacks, and lower-income workers, than on groups with higher
life expectancies, such as women, whites, Hispanics, Asians, and higher-income workers.”).
203 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (“Under the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.”).
204 See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1144 (1986) (“Individual needs and
positions may have to be taken into account in any particular situation in order to achieve
equality of outcome.”).
199
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while usually there is some degree of uncertainty about the exact quality and
quantity of the life that an individual will have, sometimes the situation is
more certain. This has the effect of dissolving the unique temporal quality
of age-based rules, at least as applied in that specific case. To use an extreme
case, consider a terminally ill teenager who is developmentally quite mature.
This individual will have a tragically short life, and she will be subject to a
variety of maturity rules that continue to deprive her of legal rights until she
dies. She will not “age out” of her legal disability, as most other minors will.
In these situations, these age-based rules might take on a wrongful character
because they exacerbate lifetime inequalities. A more common situation
would be when a birth cohort experiences a particularly burdensome set of
material conditions—such as a depression or natural disaster—such that
formal equal legal treatment along several dimensions would create unequal
and morally unjust substantive outcomes across a lifetime.205
***
These examples partially rehabilitate egalitarian theories with respect to
age, as they help us to understand the wrongfulness of certain types of age
discrimination. However, this is at best an incomplete account of age
discrimination as it leaves a large swath of it unexplained. Something more
is needed, either to replace or complement egalitarian theories. The next Part
explores how a non-comparative approach may offer a better descriptive and
normative foundation for the moral wrongfulness of age discrimination and
non-constitutional age discrimination law.

205

See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Distributive Justice and Donative Intent, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 324, 353 (2018) (“[T]reating individuals who are alike on one legally salient dimension
may not always be appropriate if the material conditions of those two individuals are
different.”); Thomas Nagel, Equality, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 60, 60 (Matthew Clayton &
Andrew Williams eds., 2000) (“It is a commonplace that real equality of every kind is
sensitive to economic factors.”).
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III. NON-COMPARATIVE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAW
While the value of equality may both explain and justify the current
landscape of constitutional law with respect to age, it falters in providing an
adequate normative foundation for age-based antidiscrimination norms or
the statutory age discrimination law that flows from them. This Part sketches
out one version of a non-comparative age discrimination law—specifically
one that is grounded in liberty or freedom—which could serve as an
alternative or supplemental basis for the field.
Liberty is certainly not the only non-comparative value that one could
use to construct such a theory, with another plausible candidate being
dignity.206 But the goal is neither to argue for any particular value nor to
elaborate all of the different aspects of a corresponding theory. It is instead
to demonstrate the contours of one such theory in enough detail to show that
it can serve as a plausible alternative to the equality-based accounts already
discussed. In addition, this Part should not be taken as an attempt to replace
wholesale the value of equality in age discrimination law. As noted earlier,
equality still has some explanatory force both normatively and descriptively
for constitutional law and for certain situations of age discrimination.
Instead, the best theory may in fact be a pluralist in nature, drawing on both
comparative and non-comparative values depending on the specific context
at issue.
In elaborating a liberty-based age discrimination law, this Part seeks to
answer two basic questions. First, how might one conceptualize the relevant
liberty interests in the context of discrimination? Section A addresses this
question. Second, since the problems for equality derived from age’s
temporal dimension, does liberty fare any better in this regard? Section B
tackles the relevant temporal issues. Finally, Section C discusses some of
the notable implications of a non-comparative age discrimination law for
current debates in discrimination theory and law.

206 See, e.g., Denise G. Reaume, Discrimination and Dignity, 63 LA. L. REV. 645, 666–
71 (2003) (tracing the importance of dignity in Canadian discrimination jurisprudence).
Dignity, however, is a notoriously slippery concept that has less salience in United States law.
See Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity As a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 848, 849
(1983) (noting that dignity’s “intrinsic meaning has been left to intuitive understanding,
conditioned in large measure by cultural factors.”). That being said, depending on how you
define it, dignity may intersect in interesting ways with both liberty and equality in the context
of discrimination law. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and
Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2007) (exploring
dignity and its relationship to equality and liberty).
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Liberty can have many meanings. At its core, it is concerned with selfdetermination.207 This is the ability to author one’s own life, choosing both
what goals to value and the path to take in pursuit of those goals.208 Beyond
this, the consensus dissolves, but the differences can be mapped in the
following ways:
Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it
is always freedom from some constraint or restriction on,
interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not
becoming something. Such freedom is thus always [1] of something
(an agent or agents), [2] from something, [3] to do, not do, become,
or not become something; it is a triadic relation.209
Perhaps the most common construal of the value comes from libertarian
scholars, who understand it as negative freedom, or freedom from
interference by the state.210 However, this conception has little to say about
what antidiscrimination norms we should pursue, and legal scholars working
in this vein have used this understanding of liberty to critique the very types
of antidiscrimination laws that this Article seeks to justify.211 Thus, a libertybased antidiscrimination law must understand the value in a different way.
A more robust understanding of liberty would conceptualize it as a set of
capabilities. A capability is the freedom of an agent to achieve certain
functionings, which encompass “doings”, or the ability to do certain things
(for example, to participate in the political process or procure gainful
employment), and “beings”, or the ability to achieve certain states of being

207 See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988)
(understanding autonomy as “a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon
their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt
to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values”)
208 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”).
209 Gerald C. MacCullum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312, 313
(1967).
210 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 191,
203–06 (1997) (characterizing this as “negative liberty”). There are several thinkers who
work in this vein. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974);
FREIDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
211 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 24–27 (1992) (valorizing freedom of contract and
arguing that it is antithetical to the antidiscrimination principle); id. at 444–48 (specifically
attacking the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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(for example, having good health).212 These liberty interests are inherently
open-ended, as one is not required to exercise them to achieve the
functionings they facilitate.213
This implies a more comprehensive understanding of the barriers that one
might face in exercising one’s freedom. While the government can certainly
be a barrier to freedom, it is not the only one. A given person’s capabilities
are a “product of her internal endowments, her external resources, and the
social and physical environment in which she lives.”214 Both private and
public discrimination impact the resources or opportunities that one
possesses as well as the legal environment that shapes one’s lifecourse. For
example, private discrimination can cut off access to markets for important
goods, while governmental rules can restrict access to legal entitlements that
allow one to participate fully as a citizen.215 This creates the need for an
antidiscrimination regulatory regime.
With the nature of the interest delineated, a further question arises: which
liberty interests, construed as capabilities, are worthy of antidiscrimination
protection? After all, not all capabilities are created equal, nor should they
be treated as such. For example, the capability to dress in the most expensive
fashions is not on par with the capability to be nourished, even if they both
implicate liberty interests. Thus, we must have some understanding of which
capabilities are sufficiently important such that we must safeguard them
through antidiscrimination norms and law. Fortunately, capabilities theorists
have constructed comprehensive lists of human capabilities that are
fundamental to a flourishing life.216 However, a shorthand way of
identifying those capabilities that are sufficiently important is to look to
current antidiscrimination law. These laws, which prohibit discrimination in

212 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 89–96 (2000) (describing the concept of functionings).
213 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Aging and Human Capabilities, in AGING THOUGHTFULLY:
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RETIREMENT, ROMANCE, WRINKLES, AND REGRET 195, 197 (Martha
C. Nussbaum & Saul Levmore eds., 2017) (noting that capabilities form core political
entitlements and “with respect to what is on the list, what’s protected is an area of choice, and
people may choose one way or another).
214 See Elizabeth Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice, in
MEASURING JUSTICE: PRIMARY GOODS AND CAPABILITIES 96 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid
Robeyns eds., 2010).
215 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Personal Delegations, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1250–
53 (2013) (describing how legal rules can serve to cut one off from fundamental human
capabilities in the context of legal incapacity).
216 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 26, at 76–78 (2006) (detailing a list of ten
fundamental capabilities, including life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination,
and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s
environment (political and material)). See also KHAITAN, supra note 62, at 95–96 (arguing
that four goods are essential to the pursuit of a good life and that the role of discrimination
law is to ensure their availability: goods to satisfy one’s biological needs, negative freedom,
an adequate range of valuable opportunities, and self-respect).
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realms such as employment and housing, identify those capabilities—the
capability to seek employment or the capability to control one’s living
situation—that are important enough to receive the protection of the law.
Having described liberty and its relationship to discrimination law, a
further question arises: what makes discrimination morally wrongful from a
liberty perspective? There are at least two possibilities. First, one might find
the wrong of discrimination in how it impairs an individual’s deliberative
freedoms, or the ability to conceptualize and actualize a plan for the good
life in domains considered important.217 The key normative point here is that
certain morally irrelevant traits should not factor into an individual’s life
plans as costs.218 For example, one should not have to contemplate one’s sex
as a cost in deciding where to work. Certain workplaces may impose such
costs by allowing sexual harassment or maintaining a sex-based wage
differential.219 Age similarly constitutes a morally irrelevant characteristic
that should not operate as a cost through the decision-making of others, even
if the aging process certainly imposes costs of various types.220
Another way of conceptualizing the non-comparative wrong of
discrimination is to focus on opportunity “bottlenecks.”221 A bottleneck in
the opportunity structure of society is a situation in which there is only one
plausible path towards achieving certain desired functionings.222 For
example, if performing well on a standardized test were the only determinant
of one’s job opportunities and earning potential (rather than being just an
entry point into one specific profession), that represents a bottleneck.223 It
217
See Moreau, supra note 27, at 147 (“In a liberal society, . . . we are each entitled to a
set of ‘deliberative freedoms,’ freedoms to deliberate about and decide how to live in a way
that is insulated from pressures stemming from extraneous traits of ours.”). See also
NUSSBAUM, supra note 26, at 77 (describing the fundamental capability of practical reason,
or “[b]eing able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the
planning of one’s life.”).
218 See Moreau, supra note 27, at 149 (“[T]here are certain traits that we believe people
should not have to factor into their deliberations, or, more exactly, should not have to factor
in as costs, even if they are deeply important to the person and relevant to her decisions.”).
See also Alan Carter, A Distinction Within Egalitarianism, 108 J. PHIL. 535, 536 (2011)
(“[W]e hold as a basic moral principle that persons ought to be treated equally unless there is
a morally significant and morally relevant difference between them that justifies unequal
treatment.”) (footnotes omitted).
219 See Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in
Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 187–88 (2011) (discussing how
preconceived notions can inappropriately influence the estimated worth of female
employees).
220 See supra text accompanying note 78–79.
221 See FISHKIN, supra note 28, at 146 (advocating for an anti-bottleneck principle: “As
far as possible, there should be a plurality of paths leading to the valued roles and goods,
without bottlenecks through which one must pass in order to reach them.”).
222 See id. at 13 (defining a bottleneck as “a narrow place in the opportunity structure
through which one must pass in order to successfully pursue a wide range of valued goals.”).
223 See id. at 130–31.
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deprives individuals of multiple potential paths to achieve certain desired
functionings and thus hinders the creation of a unique life plan. Identity
characteristics can also serve as bottlenecks. For instance, an employer might
require that employees possess no mobility impairments to stay on the job,
even if it is irrelevant to doing the job.224 This is a bottleneck based on
disability, and age can serve as a bottleneck in the same way to prevent
opportunity pluralism. According to this view, discrimination is wrongful
when it creates bottlenecks that inhibit the acquisition of important
functionings through multiple paths.
B. The Temporal Question
However it is conceptualized, liberty is a plausible basis for
understanding the moral wrong of discrimination and for justifying an agebased antidiscrimination regime. But how does it fare with respect to age’s
temporal dimension? Liberty is a non-comparative value. These types of
values protect rights or interests that are independent of the rights or interests
of others.225 Instead of focusing on a comparison to another individual, noncomparative approaches instead examine the rights or interests that one
might have by virtue of some quality that the individual possesses, such as
being human or a recognized member of a community.226 In other words,
these interests are intrinsic to the person, and they create a baseline of
treatment to which one is entitled.227 Because it does not rely on
comparisons, a non-comparative approach avoids the basic temporal
question of equality-based approaches, which is when the comparison must
occur.

224 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV.
397, 441 (2000) (describing how the design of jobs or the physical environment may
disadvantage people with disabilities).
225 See Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 298 (1974) (“[J]ustice
consists in giving a person his due, but in some cases one’s due is determined independently
of that of other people, while in other cases, a person’s due is determinable only by reference
to his relations to other persons. I shall refer to contexts, criteria, and principles of the former
kind as noncomparative, and those of the latter sort as comparative.”) (italics in original).
226 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH 36 (2011) (proposing that such capabilities inhere in a notion of life worthy of
human dignity); Hellman, supra note 196, at 55 (“According to discrimination as a violation
of liberty, a law or policy wrongfully discriminates when it infringes on a liberty to which
each person is independently entitled. The problem is not that Person X is being treated worse
than Person Y, without adequate justification. Rather, the problem is that Person X is being
denied a right to which she is entitled, period.”) (italics in original).
227 Thus, this version of antidiscrimination law adopts sufficiency, rather than equality,
as a moral ideal. See HARRY FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 134
(1988) (positing that “what is important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone
have the same but that each should have enough.”) (first italics omitted).
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Instead, it has its own analogous temporal question that it must answer.
This is whether the relevant liberty interests must be protected during an
entire lifetime or only at certain moments during the lifecourse. A logical
preliminary answer is that said liberty interests must be protected at all
times.228 The law already recognizes that self-authorship is a continuous
process, and that we retain the intrinsic right to change our goals and the
means we use to reach those goals. For example, self-binding contracts do
not have the force of law, as they bind a future self to a life plan generated
by a past self.229 Similarly, wills can be written and rewritten as many times
as one pleases, as death is the only logical end to the self-authorship
process.230 Thus, in a liberty-based scheme, the moral wrong of
discrimination derives from the deprivation of sufficiently-important
capabilities rather than the comparison of one’s legal or social entitlements
to those of another.231 This forms the normative basis of age-based
antidiscrimination law, a task for which equality is ill-suited.
One important conceptual implication of this is that a liberty-based
theory of discrimination embraces a critical stance toward a socially or
legally prescribed life course. In other words, the pathways that one might
take in pursuit of one’s life goals should not be dictated by age, and certain
opportunities should not be foreclosed solely because of age. For example,
according to this view, adoption of children should not necessarily be limited
to those of a certain age, allowing flexibility in when to pursue parenthood
during one’s lifecourse.232 The healthy skepticism about externally-imposed
life paths is not that alien a concept, as this type of liberty-based norm is
already reflected in employment discrimination law, which has over time
removed any age ceiling on the class of employees protected from age

228 See Bou-Habib, supra note 148, at 302–03 (arguing against time-limited autonomy).
See also Part III.C.2.
229 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 33, at 19–21 (noting that Ulysses contracts are not
enforceable); Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 357,
359 (1985) (“We have, then, a territory in which ‘private ordering’ is about all there is. We
must devise rules for our own behavior that entail little or no reliance on the courts . . . because
the courts refuse to extend us their jurisdiction.”). It is also the reason why contracts to sell
oneself into slavery are prohibited, as they inhibit future liberty interests to too great a degree.
See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 960 (William J. Ashley ed.,
Longmans, Green and Co. 1961).
230 See Matter of Fernandez’s Estates, 413 A.2d 998, 1002 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1980) (“A will is ambulatory and speaks only as of testator’s death.”).
231 See Richard Wagland, A Fair Innings or Complete Life: Another Attempt at an
Egalitarian Justification of Ageism, in JUSTICE FOR OLDER PEOPLE 161, 170 (Harry Lesser ed.
2012) (concluding that “an effective anti-ageist argument should appeal to the idea that there
are certain synchronic interests that have equal moral value irrespective of the chronological
age of the individual who holds them.”).
232 See, e.g., Chapter 3 the Legal Functions of Adoption, 41 IUS GENTIUM 79, 87 (2015)
(noting that most Western countries include in suitability criteria a maximum age for
adoption).
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discrimination.233 This is in notable contrast to European age discrimination
law, which more willingly embraces mandatory retirement and a particular
life stage in which one retires and receives a relatively generous pension.234
The presumption against a prescribed life course does not necessarily
mean that we must reject all social or cultural understandings of life stages
or a “normal” lifecourse. Many of these could be justified in the name of
preserving liberty for others or for oneself at some other point in the
lifecourse, promoting efficiency, or honoring some other important
competing value. For instance, in certain situations, it makes sense for some
activities to take place in a sequence, such as attending law school before
becoming a practicing attorney, or engaging in cycles of rest and work. 235
The key is that when the culture or law sets down an age-based expectation
or rule, there must be a more searching inquiry to see if it is truly justified or
not. The next Section explores some ways in which that might play out with
respect to discrimination law and theory.
C. Implications
One of the qualities of a good theory is that it proves fruitful.236 It should
expand our understanding of a particular phenomenon, and a legal theory
ideally should also provide guidance for the structure of the law.237 The noncomparative approach suggested by this Article has already proven fruitful
in understanding age discrimination law in light of age’s unique temporal
qualities as well as in justifying the current range of age-based
antidiscrimination statutes. This Section explores some additional ways in
which this approach might shed light on various phenomena, specifically in
the areas of discrimination theory, age-based distinctions in the law, and
antidiscrimination statutes.
1. Discrimination Theory
The field of discrimination law lacks a consensus normative foundation,
and a nascent debate has arisen over the value or values that undergird the

233

See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-592, §2(c)
(1986) (removing the age ceiling of the ADEA, which had been previously set at 70).
234 See Julie C. Suk, From Antidiscrimination to Equality: Stereotypes and the Life Cycle
in the United States and Europe, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 90-97 (2012) (comparing the legal
treatment of mandatory retirement in the United States and Europe).
235 See Gosseries, supra note 124, at 70–71 (discussing the rationale of sequence
efficiency).
236 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC
TRADITION AND CHANGE 321–22 (1977) (describing the five characteristics of accuracy,
consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness as desirable aspects of a theory).
237 See id. at 322.
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domain.238 Monists believe that a single value forms its normative
foundation, though they disagree whether it is equality, liberty, dignity, or
something else entirely.239 As noted earlier, the dominant value is equality,
even if theorists understand it differently in the discrimination context.240 In
contrast, pluralists believe that multiple values are at play, and the correct
approach is to determine which values operate in a particular context.241
Finally, there are those who reject the theoretical enterprise entirely,
believing the area of discrimination law is hopelessly theoretically
incoherent.242
Within the monist debate, this Article scores some points for noncomparative values such as liberty as compared with equality, since the
former have more explanatory power with respect to age. However, this does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the monists are correct. There
may be a valuable intellectual division of labor between the various values
in explaining and justifying different portions of antidiscrimination law, in
two ways. First, equality retains explanatory and justificatory power for
characteristics other than age, such as race or sex. Nothing in this Article
weakens equality’s claims on those areas of discrimination law.
Second, equality has been useful for explaining portions of age
discrimination law as well. The temporal analysis introduced in this Article
fleshes out how equality underlies the weak constitutional protection for
age.243 Equality also has the theoretical capacity to decry intersectional age
discrimination, discrimination in the context of varying social conditions,
and discrimination that hinders a group-based social or relational equality.244
A non-comparative approach, in turn, highlights reasons for relying less on
age-based rules as a matter of legislative discretion as well as for
promulgating age-based antidiscrimination statutes. Thus, while this Article
makes the case that the moral wrongfulness of age discrimination is best
238

See Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 1, 1 (noting that the philosophical discussion of issues in discrimination is a
“relatively young field of inquiry”).
239 See KHAITAN, supra note 62, at 6 (“Despite the urgency of the challenge [of finding
a normative foundation for discrimination law], theoretical consensus has so far eluded
scholars. Candidate theories can (very roughly) be classified into three broad categories:
egalitarian, liberal, and dignitarian.”); Hellman, supra note 20, at 899–900 (discussing the
battle between comparative and non-comparative values in Equal Protection jurisprudence).
240 See supra Part I.B.
241 See Lawrence Blum, Racial and Other Asymmetries: A Problem for the Protected
Categories Framework for Anti-Discrimination Thought, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
182, 188 (listing eight classes of wrongmaking features that can all serve to justify the moral
wrongfulness of discrimination).
242 See George Rutherglen, Concrete or Abstract Conceptions of Discrimination?, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 115, 122–29 (arguing against “conceptual ascent” as theory
probably cannot make sense of discrimination law).
243 See supra text accompanying notes 195–97.
244 See supra Part II.C.
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grounded in non-comparative values, it embraces a more pluralistic outlook
with regard to age discrimination law and discrimination theory more
generally. Further, it suggests that those who consider the field as
conceptually incoherent have not yet exhausted the more nuanced theoretical
possibilities.
2. Age-Based Law
Because age-based distinctions are only subject to rationality review, the
government has relatively free reign in employing age in the law.245
However, the Court has not addressed age-based distinctions in some time.246
Further, the Court has gradually blurred the tiers of scrutiny and seems more
willing to accept hybrid Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process
claims.247 Thus, there may be doctrinal space to present an argument for
some form of heightened scrutiny with regard to age, at least in some
contexts.248 This is not to say that the Court is likely to accept such an
argument any time soon, but instead to suggest that such an argument is not
theoretically foreclosed even if practically it might be.249
This raises the question of how this Article might help or hinder such
arguments. The short answer is that it might do both. On the one hand, by
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 64 (2000) (“[A] State may rely on age as
a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State’s legitimate
interests. That age proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant.”).
246 The last time the Court took up age distinctions in the law was in Vance v. Bradley.
440 U.S. 93 (1979). Thus, Murgia cannot claim the status of a “super precedent.” Michael
J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2006) (“Super precedents are
the doctrinal, or decisional, foundations for subsequent lines of judicial decisions (often but
not always in more than one area of constitutional law)”).
247 See Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97
B.U. L. REV. 425, 455 (2017) (“Although it is often overlooked, one can find many other
cases that involve a ‘hybrid’ or double helix equal protection/due process analysis.”);
Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) (“[S]ometimes looking at an issue
stereoscopically—through the lenses of both the due process clause and the equal protection
clause—can have synergistic effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by
itself.”); Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence:
Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209,
1222–24 (1999) (arguing that rights and classes are co-constitutive).
248 See Kohn, supra note 16, at 231–55 (critiquing the reasoning in Murgia and arguing
for intermediate scrutiny of classifications that affect those who are older); Eglit, supra note
40 at 904–07 (arguing for five “postulates” that would guide judicial evaluation of age
distinctions); Martin Lyon Levine, Comments on the Constitutional Law of Age
Discrimination, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1081, 1100 (1981) (arguing that “the constitutionality
of age discrimination may properly be regarded as not yet settled by holding.”)
249 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 757 (2011)
(“[T]he last classification accorded heightened scrutiny by the Supreme Court was that
based on nonmarital parentage in 1977. At least with respect to federal equal protection
jurisprudence, this canon has closed.”) (foonote omitted).
245
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elaborating on the truncated equality analysis in Murgia, it provides a firmer
moral foundation for the implicit lifetime egalitarianism that animates a
rational basis level of review. On the other hand, by demonstrating that an
alternative moral foundation for the wrongness of age discrimination might
be found in non-comparative values, it lends normative strength to hybrid
class/rights claims involving age and a significant rights infringement.250
Assuming that rational basis is likely entrenched for the moment, the
moral case against age discrimination laid out in this Article can only act as
guidance to legislators and administrative officials who might contemplate
using age-based rules. In short, the guidance is this: age distinctions are
morally suspect, and age should be treated as a disfavored legal criterion.
Thus, absent other moral or practical concerns, age-based legal distinctions
in important social domains should be avoided. I would offer some
preliminary thoughts on how this guidance might be applied in two important
contexts: maturity rules for minors and public benefits rules for adults.
Given that a liberty-based theory of age discrimination values liberty
interests across the lifecourse, it might at first seem difficult to reconcile such
a non-comparative theory with the large body of maturity rules. These
discriminate against minors on the basis of age by depriving them of certain
liberty-based entitlements that would almost certainly be included in one’s
conception of a flourishing life. In other words, does a non-comparative
theory of age discrimination law require the abolition of age-based maturity
rules, or can they still be justified?
Many of these rules would survive inspection, for three reasons. First,
many maturity rules operate to safeguard one’s capability set across the
lifecourse. For example, granting the right to have sex at too early an age
may have significant consequences, such as pregnancy or sexually
transmitted infections, which will seriously impact the capability sets that
one might enjoy later in life.251 This type of rationale was at play with
California’s recently-passed “Eraser Law,” which requires websites to delete
upon request content that is posted by minors, as a way of preventing it from
haunting them later as adults.252

250 See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1135 (2004) (“In
cases where the Court has confronted claims of not-quite-deprivation of liberty, as
experienced by persons in not-quite-suspect classes, it has in practice displayed a
willingness to take into account a kind of cross-doctrinal cumulative weighting of the
interests involved and the consequences of adverse legal treatment.”)
251 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1218
(2015) (discussing the consequences of sexual activity in the context of adult incapacity).
252 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22581 (West 2013) (requiring Internet-related entities to
“[p]ermit a minor . . . to request and obtain removal of, content or information posted on the
operator's Internet Web site, online service, online application, or mobile application by the
user.”). This law has been subject to extensive criticism, for a variety of reasons. See, e.g.,
Eric Goldman, California’s New ‘Online Eraser’ Law Should be Erased, FORBES (Sept. 24,
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Second, adults possess a liberty interest in raising their children as they
see fit.253 Thus, maturity rules must balance parents’ liberty interests in this
important domain against the emerging liberty interests of their children.
The law of child emancipation is the area in which this plays out most
explicitly.254 While the balancing of liberty interests might occur in other
contexts, this conflict is inherent and heightened in the parent-child
relationship. This identifies what will be a recurring issue in the application
of a liberty-based theory to discrimination law, which is how individuals’
different liberty interests intersect and conflict. Fortunately, such balancing
is not a new issue, and several liberal theories of societal organization have
grappled with how to resolve it.255
Third, the right to self-determination is at least partially reliant on
possessing the mental or physical capacities to exercise it. Age-based
distinctions are blunt attempts to calibrate the liberty granted by certain
rights to those presumed capacities.256 The validity of such calibrations, in
turn, relies on scientific understandings of developmental capacity across the
population as a whole.257 There is some evidence that the particular age
cutoffs employed by several maturity rules are in fact incorrect and should
be changed, but the existence of some age cutoff can be morally justified.258
A similar calibration would not be appropriate with respect to old age, given
the greater diversity of the aging process, even if there might be capacity
issues created by conditions such as dementia in individual cases.259

2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/09/24/californias-new-online-eraserlaw-should-be-erased/#5d53bbdf7a33.
253 See Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 438–45 (2006)
(discussing the role of parental rights in constitutional jurisprudence).
254 See Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV.
267 (1995) (reviewing the history of the children’s rights movements).
255 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8–10 (1980);
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191–92 (1985); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 325–28 (1971).
256 Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055,
1095–96 (2010) (“The immature have an interest in exercising those specific liberties of
which they are capable. Determining which liberties they are capable of exercising, however,
can present any number of difficulties—even where researchers have identified normative
capacities, for example, there will be individuals whose capacities vary from the norm.”).
257 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process,
and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 816–17 (2005) (noting that while
developmental pathways differ, there are some generalizations that can be made).
258 See generally Elizabeth S. Scott et. al., Young Adulthood As A Transitional Legal
Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641 (2016)
(critically examining neurobiological evidence and how it relates to criminal law’s treatment
of younger offenders).
259 See, e.g., Boni-Saenz, supra note 251, at 1234–35 (proposing a legal test for dealing
with dementia in the sexual consent context).
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Another area in which skepticism of age-based distinctions will have an
outsized impact is in the law governing public benefits.260 In this context,
age is used to target populations that may have specific needs.261 For
example, the provision of the Affordable Care Act that allows individuals to
stay on their parents’ health insurance until they are twenty-six addresses the
lack of health insurance among this group.262 Similarly, Social Security rules
only allow the collection of retirement benefits in one’s sixties, which
addresses the need for income support among this likely retired set.263 Both
of these distinctions, and others, are called into question based on the
normative guidance described above. The rationales employed to justify
maturity rules are also largely inapplicable in these cases.
This could nudge the law in one of two directions. First, it could lead the
government to rely on need, rather than age, as the legal criterion of choice.
While this would theoretically achieve more accurate targeting than age,
such means-testing has significant disadvantages. It is costly to operate,
stigmatizes benefits recipients, and puts such programs in a politically
precarious situation.264 Second, the abandonment of age could lead to the
adoption of more universalist approaches.265 For example, instead of using
age or need as the way of maintaining income support programs, one could
pursue a basic income—unconditional cash transfers to all citizens or
residents not conditioned on personal characteristics.266
Universalist
policies tend to be more expensive but also more politically sustainable.267
Regardless of which option is chosen, disfavoring age as a basis for public
law distinctions will require an analysis of different policy options for
accomplishing the goals that age previously did.
260 See Elizabeth A. Kutza & Nancy R. Zweibel, Age as a Criterion for Focusing Public
Programs, in AGE OR NEED?: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR OLDER PEOPLE 55, 82– 91 (Bernice
Neugarten ed., 1982) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of using age for allocation
of social resources).
261 See id.
262 See supra note 56.
263 See What is Full Retirement Age?, 20 C.F.R. § 404.409 (2015).
264 See Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care Financing: A Look to the Future,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 745 (1991) (noting the problems with means-testing).
265 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8 (2008) (arguing for vulnerability as a
“universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition that must be at the heart of our
concept of social and state responsibility.”).
266 See Philippe Van Parijs, Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the TwentyFirst Century, in REDESIGNING DISTRIBUTION: BASIC INCOME AND STAKEHOLDER GRANTS AS
CORNERSTONES FOR AN EGALITARIAN CAPITALISM 3, 4 (Erik Olin Wright ed., 2006) (defining
a basic income as “an income paid by a political community to all its members on an
individual basis, without means test or work requirement”). See also Miranda Perry Fleischer
& Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for A Basic Income, 2017 WIS. L. REV.
1189, 1270–71 (making the libertarian case for the basic income).
267 See GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 28
(1990) (“All benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay.”).
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3. Antidiscrimination Statutes
While a non-comparative approach would view age-based distinctions in
the public sphere with skepticism, it would likely welcome further statutory
regulation of private discriminatory conduct on the basis of age. As a
preliminary matter, this would mean including age in the host of
antidiscrimination statutes in which it is not present, such as the Fair Housing
Act.268 The argument for inclusion in other antidiscrimination statutes
depends on the importance of the domain in question as well as any
countervailing moral or practical concerns.269
Once age is included in a statutory scheme, a non-comparative approach
also provides guidance for how to structure the statute. For example,
consider the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the quality of
symmetry.270 The symmetry principle “mandates that once certain attributes
or characteristics are identified as worthy of antidiscrimination protection,
all groups within that universal ground must be protected.”271 Symmetry in
discrimination law has typically been analyzed using the lens of equality,
and it has been debated primarily in the context of affirmative action, a racebased asymmetrical policy.272 The unequal harm suffered by one side of the
protected category justifies the pro-asymmetry position, while symmetry is
often favored because it avoids the legal reinforcement of potentiallypernicious social categories.273
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is asymmetrical in two
ways: It only protects those over the age of forty,274 and the Supreme Court
has ruled that the Act does not prohibit discrimination against younger

268 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (West 2016) (including a variety of identity categories but
omitting age).
269 See supra text accompanying notes 124–27.
270 See, e.g., Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law,
2017 WIS. L. REV. 69, 121 (arguing for symmetry); Blum, supra note 241, at 185–87 (arguing
for asymmetry). See also John E. Morrison, Viva La Diferencia: A Non-Solution to the
Difference Dilemma, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 973, 1009 n.19 (1994) (collecting scholarly analysis of
how courts shift between symmetrical and asymmetrical analysis depending on the issue).
271 Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1085, 1088 (2017).
272 See generally Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381 (1989)
(discussing how Supreme Court justice draw on different concepts, including symmetry, to
justify their stances toward affirmative action).
273 Compare Areheart, supra note 271, at 1123–29 (arguing that asymmetry is
permissible when traits are not universal and there exists a subordinated group) with Mary
Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination
Law As A Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449–50 (2000) (arguing that
in the context of sex discrimination, symmetry assists in eliminating sex stereotypes).
274 See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2012) (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to
individuals who are at least 40 years of age.”).
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members of that protected class in favor of older ones.275 A liberty-based
analysis underscores the moral dimension of asymmetry and shows its faults.
To the extent that the wrong of age discrimination in employment is that it
infringes on an intrinsic interest that we all possess, the asymmetrical
structure of age-based antidiscrimination laws do not withstand muster.
Further, as an empirical matter, the young also suffer from age
discrimination in employment.276 This counsels in favor of removing the age
floor and requiring equal treatment for all members of the protected class.
***
This Section has demonstrated that a non-comparative theory of
discrimination law is not only theoretically valuable, but also generative in
the realms of legal theory and law reform. While the practical reforms
suggested here would have to contemplate the range of practical objections
as well as moral considerations deriving from other values, that conversation
is likely to be more focused and productive.

CONCLUSION
Age is unique. No other identity characteristic has a similar relationship
with time, and the implications of its temporal character are significant for
the normative foundation of age discrimination law. As a descriptive matter,
a non-comparative value such as liberty is better suited to explain nonconstitutional age discrimination law. As a normative matter, such a value
foundation has the conceptual resources to identify the moral wrong of age
discrimination and justify the current age-based antidiscrimination law
regime, whereas equality does not. It further generates insights that deepen
our understanding of several controversies in discrimination law and theory.
This Article thus leaves us in a better position to evaluate the morality of
age-based distinctions and proposals for law reform.

275 See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004) (“The question
in this case is whether [the ADEA] prohibits favoring the old over the young. We hold it does
not.”).
276 See Susan Bisom-Rapp & Malcolm Sargeant, Diverging Doctrine, Converging
Outcomes: Evaluating Age Discrimination Law in the United Kingdom and the United
States, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 717, 741–42 (2013) (describing discrimination against the
young).
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